


Harish Kapur

THINKING FOR TOMORROW

A BOOK OF TEXTS FOR OUR TIMES



SELECTED AND EDITED

By

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HAR PRASAD BHARGAVA

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
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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In preparing this book for the use of Indian undergraduates I have had in mind the need for giving them a selection of texts that would present to them some currents of contemporary thought. How shall we today distinguish between right and wrong? What is the function of art in a civilized community? And what in such a community are the limits of religion, philosophy and science? How does science affect the modern mind? Is power always and in itself dangerous? Is non-violence practicable in the modern world? What are the causes of modern war? Is nationalism commendable? What is the way to universal peace and plenty? Here are some of the questions to which the youth of today must give serious thought if it is to know a happy tomorrow in a saner and more tranquil world; and it is to promote such thinking for tomorrow that the thoughts on these questions of some contemporary thinkers of distinction are here presented.

Without the cooperation of the authors here represented, or of their publishers, this book could

not have been compiled, and I must express my gratitude to them for their kindness in permitting me to reproduce their work.

I am also grateful to the half a dozen universities that have prescribed this book for one or other of their undergraduate courses and thus encouraged me to bring out a second edition.

I may add that the present edition does not differ from its predecessors except in very minor revisions and corrections.

P. E. D.


University of Delhi.

Hari Ji Kapoor
B. Leon Pontre

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HARI JI KAPOOR



RIGHT AND WRONG

VISCOUNT SAMUEL

We live in an age of confusion. The old standards of conduct established in an age of faith no longer command general acceptance. How then is modern man to determine what is right and what is wrong? It is to this very vital question that Viscount Samuel, Liberal British politician and philosopher, has addressed himself in the following passage, which is a chapter of his book of practical philosophy, *Belief and Action* (1937).

Our times are lacking in agreed standards of right and wrong. People were accustomed to look to the religion into which they were born to furnish them. But now the adherents of each religion are more fully aware of the existence of other religions, proclaiming sometimes different standards. The authority of all of them is questioned. Revelation, intuition, conscience—no claim can be accepted uncritically. Dogmas and precepts must all be submitted to the rational judgment. Where shall reason itself find a criterion?

We expect philosophy to provide it. But it must be confessed that philosophy gives little help. For a long time the idealist school dominated philosophic thought. Platonists and Neo-Platonists, Kantians and Hegelians, set out to find the Idea of Virtue, the Absolute Good, the Categorical Imperative, the Ultimate Values of Truth, Beauty and

Goodness. From these guidance was to be drawn for the life of man. After two thousand years of search along that line, no system has been found which commands general acceptance. There is indeed no school of philosophy of any kind to which we can point and say—here is the teaching which gives to mankind the rational basis for practical morals.

Thinkers of the eighteenth century propounded a doctrine of Natural Rights. It was asserted that each man came into the world endowed with certain rights in relation to society. They were fundamental; all laws and customs must conform to them; by them could be determined the standards of right and wrong. The theory of Natural Rights had a profound influence upon the politics of the time. The American Declaration of Independence stated in its preamble: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." Thirteen years later the French National Assembly declared, "The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security and resistance of oppression." A truth, however, is not "self-evident" unless it is such that no sane man will deny it. These principles have constantly been denied. At the very time, indeed, that the Declaration of Independence proclaimed the

inalienable right of all men to liberty, negro slavery was a legalized institution in the United States, and it remained so for nearly a century afterwards. In many parts of Europe in our own day the claim to liberty has been challenged by philosophers and rejected by dictators. The "natural and imprescriptible right of property" is repudiated by a hundred and seventy millions of people in Russia. Assertion is not enough. (It is not enough to proclaim that this or that is "self-evident". If someone says that, for him, it is not self-evident, what then?)

Thinkers of the nineteenth century believed that a firm basis for ethics was to be found in the principle of Evolution. Nature had decreed a struggle for existence as the means to the survival of the fittest, and so to the progress of the species. Harsh, even cruel, in its working, the process was ultimately beneficent. Here, then, was the test of right and wrong. Whoever conformed to nature's decree was doing right; whoever tried to impede it was doing wrong, as well as attempting the impossible. This process, pervading the life of sea, swamp and jungle, must apply also to human societies. It was held to justify an unrestrained economic competition between individuals, a conscienceless bargaining between interests, a ruthless struggle between States. Industrial oppression was part of the natural order of things, and war the ordained instrument of the progress of mankind.

Closer thinking soon showed that all this was

fallacious. The very term "Law of evolution" was seen to be misleading. It is unfortunate, and the source of much confusion, that the word "Law" is used in two quite different senses, one in science, the other in ordinary affairs. "The Laws of Motion", for example, or "the Law of Evolution", are not commands; they are simply names for processes, for sequences of events. They have nothing in common with a moral law, such as "Thou shalt not steal", or with the laws enacted by legislatures and enforced by penalties. There are no "commands" issued by "Nature", for "Nature" has no personality—is indeed nothing more than a useful figure of speech. If we will, we may imitate the methods of the sea, the swamp and the jungle, or we may find better methods if we can, and there is no cosmic legislation to enforce the one or to forbid the other.

Further, as Huxley pointed out, "survival of the fittest" does not mean survival of the best. It means no more than "the survival of those best fitted to cope with their circumstances." It often leads to degeneration and not to the development of higher types. Evolution in nature, then, furnishes for man no moral standards of any kind. The attempt to find them there failed, having worked much mischief in the meantime.

There is yet another possible basis for an ethical code, seldom advocated nowadays, but accepted in earlier times almost universally—the custom of the community. "Originally," says Bergson, "custom is the whole of morality, and as religion

forbids departure from custom, morality is co-extensive with religion." The idea is enshrined, for example, in the ancient Hindu laws of Manu : "the custom handed down in regular succession from time immemorial is called the conduct of virtuous men." But this involves the conclusion that whatever are the laws and customs of a particular society at a particular time must be accepted in perpetuity. It would compel us to believe that "cannibalism is moral in a cannibal country." [Ethics becomes a stereotyped code, and no generation may ever seek a better standard of conduct than its predecessor. We need hardly stay to examine more closely that creed. Civilization emerges from barbarism precisely through the discovery that the right is not identical with the customary.]

After so many negatives where shall we find our positive? If neither theology, nor intuition, nor natural rights, nor the principle of evolution, nor established custom can give us the test that we need, where shall we find it? Is there no answer to the challenge of the sceptic—After all, what is Right and Wrong?

While the idealist philosophers have been striving to find some *a priori* principle of ethics, the ordinary people of the world, who have to live, and to live in communities, have been silently developing, all through the ages, their own systems of practical morals. While philosophers have been trying, as it were, to construct the roof first and then hang the house from it, the people have been

building, brick by brick, from the foundations up. And the house stands. The philosophy for which we are searching is there all the time—is in practice all around us; only we do not recognise it as a philosophy because it is not dignified by the name. It uses no technical terms; but in effect it abandons the *a priori* and proceeds *a posteriori*. It adopts the simple rule that right is that which leads to good results and wrong that which leads to bad results.

Ideas, principles, laws, customs, actions, are to be judged by their consequences. They are to be accounted right if they will conduce to welfare, and wrong if they will not.

At once the question presents itself—What is meant by “welfare”? To this no short answer can be given. Welfare cannot be defined in a single phrase. It is the collective name for a great number of different things, each one of which is beneficial.

We see in the world about us what, in general, these things are. Some arise out of our physical characters. Health rather than sickness; a meal when one is hungry; a rest when one is tired; a shelter from the weather—that these are “goods” is indeed self-evident, for this at least no sane man would deny. There are satisfactions derived from sympathy and love and the fulfilment of duty. There are the gifts of art and science, and all the achievements of a high civilization. There are pleasures, innocuous in themselves, that gratify the

mind or the body. " 'Dost thou think, because thou art virtuous, there shall be no more cakes and ale?' —'Yes, by Saint Anne; and ginger shall be hot i' the mouth, too' ".

It is not possible to bring all these into a single definition of welfare, or of "the Good". Any definition wide enough to be complete would be too vague to be useful.

What guidance, then, is given by this principle when we are trying to decide whether any particular thing is good or not? Apart from the obvious physical cases of health and the like, how are we to evaluate "goods"? What kind of civilization is to be considered "high"?

The answer here must be that, in this as in all else, intuition and reason must combine to guide us. Experience is the chief test. Discussion, experiment and example are the means to a conclusion. In some matters, indeed, it makes no great difference what the choice is. A preference for one flavour or one odour rather than for another, for one kind of music or for one kind of scenery—these raise no ethical questions, and individual taste is the arbiter. But where different results do follow from the choice, then the test is to be found in the probable consequences. The conclusions reached, in each case or group of cases, by individual judgments, and ultimately by the common sense of mankind, set the standards of good and bad, establish the rules of right and wrong. If fuller experience shows that a conclusion was mistaken,

or if new conditions render it no longer sound, then, by the same process it may be changed. Thus, over long periods of time, sometimes by slow imperceptible changes, sometimes suddenly and after vehement controversies, the customs of society have been evolved and our ways of living established.

Countless are the issues which have had to be solved, or are now being solved, in the age-long and world-wide process of history. Human sacrifice, tribal raids, slavery—are these good or bad? Is toleration in religion a right policy? Is the duel the right way to settle disputes? Is war on the whole a good thing or a bad thing? These are examples. And on the narrower scale of individual conduct, every day and everywhere we have to choose whether this object or that is good; if both are good, which is the better; if both are bad, which is the lesser evil. We are always asking ourselves what are likely to be the results, direct and indirect, of our choice, whether they will make for welfare or against it.

Does this mean that each person on every occasion has to consider afresh all the possible consequences of the action he may be taking? If so, the result must be moral chaos; the task would be far beyond the powers of the deepest and quickest thinker, much more of average men and women. And does it mean that such general conceptions as virtue, duty, good character, are to be dropped? That would be the negation of morality.

Neither of these follows. Consider what has in fact happened. In course of centuries this thing

and that, this action and that, have been found by experience to be "good." The human intelligence has grouped the particular goods together. This class of things or of actions is good, that class is bad. There come into being general rules of conduct. Social customs develop. They are formulated, fortified, expanded, by religious creeds and legal codes. Sometimes a prophet, a seer or a poet will sum up in a flash the diffused, and perhaps unrealised, experience of generations; his insight is recognised, his teaching accepted, his authority afterwards points the way. Or the lessons of the past may be crystallised in a proverb, which becomes the popular guide in current cases. In ways such as these certain qualities come to be ranked as good and to count as virtues—truthfulness, honesty, courage and the rest; their opposites bad, and as vices. Individual habits are formed—good habits or bad habits. The normal person, in the ordinary conditions of daily life, does not ponder at every moment what is right and what is wrong; he usually acts by habit and as a matter of course. Custom in the community corresponds to habit in the individual.

The conclusion to be drawn—important to our present discussion—is this. When doubtful issues arise; or when there is reason to think that a habit or a custom, an article in a creed or a law in a code, is bad and ought to be changed—we are not obliged to seek a criterion in some Absolute Good or Categorical Imperative. It is futile to turn to any such mystical or transcendental conceptions.

They are no more than "fictional abstractions." They possess no intrinsic authority; they may all be challenged and defied. But we may go back to facts. We may appeal to the evidence of actual experience; and on that basis we may make, where necessary, a fresh valuation of consequences.

The problem is often put whether, in morals, it is the rightness of an action that matters, or the rightness of the motive. If a person, with the best of intentions, does something which proves to be injurious, was his action good or bad? And conversely, where a person, animated by a corrupt motive, takes a course which turns out to be beneficial, was he acting rightly or wrongly? But to put the problem in that way is to confuse the issue. There are two questions to be answered and not one. One issue is—was the man's motive good? The other is—was the course he chose the right one? The answer may well be in the affirmative in one case and in the negative in the other. The right motive is one good thing and the right action is another good thing.

This discussion may seem at first sight abstract, and remote from our main theme. We are, however, in search of a way out from the intellectual anarchy of our time. We are complaining that there is no agreed basis for moral standards. We have found that those offered by the several religions must be tested by the rational judgment. We cannot discover in the idealist philosophies any criterion by which that judgment can be applied.

If, then, we are challenged to say what other criterion there is, we are bound to give an answer, and to defend our answer against criticism.

We see that mankind long ago has found empirically the principle on which codes of conduct can be based: actions are right or wrong according to their effects upon welfare; welfare is not one thing, but is compounded of many. This principle, of course, is not itself a code of conduct. Nor can it produce a code by any short or easy process. Bentham believed that, where a choice was to be made between two courses, the pleasures and the pains that would follow from each could be estimated, and be divided, so to speak, into lots; these could be multiplied by the number of people concerned; the totals balanced against each other; and the result of the sum would tell which of the two courses was the better. But the matter is not so simple as this. In ethics there is no calculating machine which, by the turning of a handle, will give the answer to our problems.

Through all the centuries of human history, and most actively in our own times, an immense process of private judgment and public discussion has been at work. Out of it have emerged the rules of right and wrong, for all the varied activities of life, which we have inherited from the generations that have gone before us. Through that same process we confirm, or in our turn we mould and modify, those rules before handing them on to our successors. Throughout that process

immediate advantages have to be weighed against later advantages, benefits to the individual balanced against benefits to the society; the good of a nation considered in relation to the good of mankind. Experiment, publicity, education, persuasion, legislation, are the instruments. Theologians and philosophers, statesmen and poets have helped on the process. But not seldom they have confused and hindered it; through proclaiming general principles which prove to be unsound, or drawing from sound principles false deductions.

(This vast process is not a science. There are no fixed laws that it can follow.) It allows no clear predictions. The factors are too many, too varied, too changing to permit it to become a science; although parts of it—in ethics, politics, economics, eugenics—may be handled in a scientific spirit. Viewed as a whole the process is an art. It is in fact the art of living.

CIVILIZATION AND THE ARTS

W. MACNEILE DIXON

What purpose do the arts serve in this age of science? Is there, in other words, any future for poetry, painting, music and the other arts? Can there be any real civilization without the arts? Today when the claim of science to be considered the greatest benefactor of mankind is pressed so hard in certain quarters, the claim of the arts to be considered an equally great, if not a greater, benefactor is apt to be overlooked. W. Macneile Dixon, himself a poet and literary artist, puts forward the case for the arts. What is reproduced below is the greater part of the opening essay in his collection of essays entitled *An Apology for the Arts* (1944).

It is commonly assumed or believed that the arts deal in fancies rather than in facts, in flights of imagination rather than harsh realities, that poetry is 'a kind of ingenious nonsense,' that one and all they are the occupations of idle dreamers, and that we must take counsel with men of stiffer grain, of a very different and superior order to assist us in the building of a better world. Well, is it so?

We cannot fail to observe that poets and artists are seldom included in the accredited histories of human thought. They are not usually mentioned among the profound and penetrating philosophic minds. And yet I cannot avoid asking myself, what else, if not thinking, was Cervantes doing when he wrote that wonder of wonders among books, *Don Quixote*, or Ictinus when he designed

that miracle of loveliness, the Parthenon at Athens? For my part I cannot assign, let us say Euripides, to a lower intellectual rank than Hobbes, or Locke; declare Beethoven less logical than Kant, or Rembrandt than John Stuart Mill. To think Michelangelo's mind less profound than Galileo's, Shakespeare's less subtle than Spinoza's, seems to me a strange reversal of the truth. For the poets and artists had a talent hard to match. To their mental depth and acuteness they added an imaginative, a creative power so rare and astonishing as, on that count alone, to win the hearts of men. Comparisons are odious, and in this field also a trifle ridiculous. If made at all, it must peremptorily be said that to succeed greatly in the arts demands not less 'fundamental brainwork' than in any of the higher undertakings of the mind. Within the field of pure reason and intelligence the poets and artists take, in their own manner, and by no means in an inferior manner, their rightful place with the most exact and comprehensive thinkers the world has known.

No one in his senses will attempt to diminish the glory of modern science. Let us, however, bear in mind an obvious truth. Before so much as the word 'science' rose above the intellectual horizon, countless millions of human beings had passed across the great stage, lived in most respects much as we ourselves live, as perforce all must live, eating and drinking, marrying, sorrowing, rejoicing. Despite all our advantages, all our knowledge, in their day

and generation it does not appear they were less happy and contented than we. The Greeks, in their most brilliant era, who attained two thousand years ago so high a pitch of culture, knew nothing of science in our understanding of it, its conveniences and blessings. Of chemistry, of astronomy, and all the rest they had not a modern schoolboy's knowledge. Physiology and pathology did not exist. Medicine and surgery were in their babyhood. Nevertheless in their absence, even in the absence of the modern wonderful inventions, Plato and Aristotle, Aeschylus and Aristophanes, Socrates and Pericles appear to have suffered little hardship, to have thought and written, carved and built, as well, to say the least of it, as most men since, and in the absence of all the paraphernalia of modern education to have attained a highly respectable degree of wisdom and civility. How are we to suppose all this came about? One wonders occasionally whether our much talked-of civilization has all the advantages our fancy paints, whether its accumulated machinery of fast and furious distractions leaves us time for thought at all, or bears any profitable relation to our inner lives.)

To what conclusions, then, are we driven? Not, indeed, that the things our forerunners lacked are worthless things;—the railways, the telephones, the electric light have their value. Conclude we must, however, that a high state of civilization, define it as you will, may be attained without them. (It does not consist, as some have fondly

imagined, in the knowledge of nature's laws or the control of her forces. And to another inference no less certain and important: machinery cannot make civilization. If we propose to look to science for our salvation, there is this to bear in mind. Science moves on the circumference of our lives. She has her being in the outer and physical world, as far removed from the interior region of our deepest and most intimate experiences as the northern from the southern pole.

There is, as everyone knows, a province of human life—and only upon reflection do we perceive how vast, how boundless is that province—to whose interests and province the most extensive knowledge or control of nature's machinery affords no entrance, a country upon which the bright sun of science sheds not a ray of light. It is the country of the soul. We have our affections and sympathies, we have loves and friendships, we have hopes and fears and admirations, inmates of a province of real things as broad and deep as the telescopic heavens above our heads. Of these things science never speaks. She sits above the battle and has no share in our joys and sorrows. Of good and evil, freedom and justice, science has nothing to say. The scientific vocabulary does not include such words as beauty or heroism, nobility or charm, resignation or despair, kindness or generosity, character or conduct. Not until you ponder such words do you perceive how narrow and inhuman is the view that omits them, the internal experiences with

which our minds are so continuously occupied from the cradle to the grave.

Is it necessary to remind ourselves that the physical sciences exclude the humanities, and are not interested in the great pageant of the world, the rise and fall of kingdoms, the lives of great men, statesmen, martyrs, soldiers, saints, or their part in the shaping of history, that they never so much as mention the revolutions, the wars, the religions, the mighty events in the panorama of the past? How vast, then, is the gap in the scientific programme. And how fantastic to suppose, if we do suppose, that the sciences, which are by their nature excluded or exclude themselves from the province of the heart and its affections, can minister to our most urgent and deepest necessities, and, unassisted, build for us the society of our dreams. The arts, which are at home where the sciences are strangers, in the very region where logic is at a loss and the most lofty understanding ill at ease, can hardly fail to prove themselves the better guides and interpreters through the labyrinth of mankind's perplexities.

Ours is an age of crowding doubts, and among them a deep misgiving haunts the world today. It has begun to doubt the power or sufficiency of the unassisted reason to resolve its torturing problems, and of political and economic devices to meet and serve its needs. Pursued though it be through weary days and sleepless nights, the search for material remedies to soothe or cure our spiritual diseases can have only one end—failure. Much

more will be needed than to feed the hungry, house the poor, clothe the destitute, however generously contrived and devotedly administered these undertakings may be. The day of acceptance of the great truth approaches, than which a greater was never yet proclaimed, that 'man does not live by bread alone'. With its acceptance and not till then will be laid the foundation-stone of a civilization worth the name.

For 1453
little
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same
Four hundred years have passed since that famous era of startling events and discoveries entitled by historians the Renaissance. We are still governed by Renaissance ways of thought, and among the heart-shaking, spirit-searching thoughts that took shape in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and that entered and took possession of the European mind, one new idea must be assigned pride of place, so commanding was it, so uplifting, so supreme. (It was the idea of progress. The idea of a continuous advance of the human race towards a nobler and happier world, an earthly paradise. The very thought aroused hope and stimulated effort. It provided an aim, an ideal, an adventure, a common understanding for all mankind. This immense expectation or inspired vision, to us so familiar and so natural, had, difficult as it is to believe, never entered and had no place in the mental furniture of the medieval nor yet the ancient world. The men of earlier days entertained no such hope for themselves or the generations to come. No such sunlit, encouraging prospect had ever

before been harboured upon earth since creation's dawn. What wonder, then, that a conception that magnificently widened the hopes and enhanced the values of life captured the human mind? For it transformed the whole scene of existence.

How, then, do matters stand today? The Renaissance had two sides. It displayed itself in an enthusiasm for the newly discovered classical civilization in its brilliant achievements; it displayed itself also in the spirit of scientific enquiry. To which, if any comparison can be instituted between them, do we owe the most; from which may we expect in future the greatest benefits? So far scientific enquiry is in the saddle and leads the field. [Yet is it not evident that for some reason, since our attention has been mainly directed to the external world and material things and our knowledge of them so marvellously increased, the human spirit has suffered hardship and become of less account, human life diminished in importance, and our hearts have been depressed? Can it be truly said that during the reign of science, during the centuries of its triumphant progress, we have attained a higher standard of humanity, justice, honour or chivalry? Is there to be found around us today an increase of happiness, any clear or certain evidence of higher and more hopeful spirits? Has brute force disappeared or given way in any degree to reasonableness and courtesy? Can we assert that truth, beauty and nobility are held in greater respect than in earlier days, or that in our needs and requirements

in the inner life of man
Science has failed to bring about a change
 there has been any spiritual progress? If science, then, has not carried the banner of progress to the heights we hoped to climb, the causes of our discontent are not far to seek. We asked her to perform an impossible task to which she never addressed herself, and with which she was not concerned. In her own and chosen undertaking, the study of nature and of our material surroundings, the successes of science have surpassed all expectation. The failure was not hers but ours. It was a cardinal error to assume that she could make any substantial contribution to the improvement of human nature, or to the elevation and refinement of human character or human conduct. [Intoxicated by the conquests of physical nature, we supposed them sufficient for all our needs, and in our exultation forgot the simple truth that man is not merely a reasoning being, that knowledge of nature's ways does not satisfy his heart, nor does a purely intellectual diet feed his moral and spiritual being, his ideals, aims, and aspirations.]

You recall Pope's famous line, 'The proper study of mankind is man.' And we may, I think, agree that in the interests of any form of civilization yet devised the conquest of man over himself, over his will and passions, over his animal nature, is of no less importance than the subjugation and control of the forces of nature. *not of nature by man.*

If any subject occupies the public mind today it is education. But what kind of education have we in view? To educate the mind is difficult enough, but how much more troublesome the education of

the emotions. Accuracy of thinking is not, as is commonly supposed, a rarer thing than refinement or delicacy of sensibility. In my belief it is much more widely distributed and more highly appreciated. Far more care is given by the state to the education of the intellect than of the feelings. The values of quick wits, a good memory, sharp intelligence, and exact thinking are universally recognized. But where are we to look for a similar recognition of the values of right feeling, of taste, of delicate discernment, of quality rather than force of mind, of sensitivity and sympathy in social intercourse, which are powers and faculties of the soul? By this taste we distinguish the scholar from the pedant, by his possession of taste, the gentleman from the barbarian. It is the standard of refinement prevailing among its citizens that exalts a nation, and by which a civilization may be judged. Brains and knowledge you may have in abundance and yet remain a savage. Examples are not far to seek in the world today. Look around and you will, I think, become vividly aware that to educate and discipline the soul is of no less vital consequence in any society than to accumulate information or add a cubit to its intellectual stature.

Suppose we were to give our thoughts another turn. 'After all,' remarked a Cambridge mathematician of *Paradise Lost*, 'what does it prove?' And clearly, if exact knowledge or power over nature's forces be your aim, poetry, music and the other arts will not hasten to your aid. If you are

The standard of civilization is judged by the interests which the people of the nation have. refinement of sensibility is of more consequence.

asked of the frieze of the Parthenon, or a melody of Handel's, or one of Turner's landscapes, 'What does it prove?' You have to confess that it proves nothing. Not one of these or similar works demonstrates any proposition or leads to any conclusion of which you can make any obvious or profitable use. The fine arts labour under this awkward disability. They have little connection with the multitudinous activities or undertakings of the community. Yet if the pursuit of the arts does nothing more than bring or confer happiness upon the human family, we cannot go far wrong in their company, for in the word 'happiness' is summed up all the desires, all the needs of mankind, yes, even of angels, or the gods themselves.

That brilliant Irishman, Richard Steele, lost an estate by his choice of a party. But he preferred, he said, the state of his mind to the state of his fortune. The fine arts prove nothing. To speak of them in connection with our social problems seems utterly irrelevant. Statesmen pay small attention to them. One hears no mention of them at elections. Politely accepted they may be, and allowed to be ornamental, none the less also tacitly assumed to be of small consequence. The urgent question arises whether a man's state of mind or a people's state of mind is in fact of minor or trifling importance, or on the contrary, as Steele perceived, of major and transcendent importance. What can be more useful than a state of mind? It is the most useful of all things, an end in itself. For a happy

state of mind is a heavenly state of mind, and takes you back to the Garden of Eden before the Fall, before the desire for knowledge brought about the great catastrophe.

To claim the poets, painters, musicians as the best friends and allies of civilization may very well be regarded by the majority of men as a mere extravagance, a high and mighty claim, not to be seriously entertained. The answer is, a still more exalted claim has been advanced for them. Let me recall to you the attitude of that remarkable genius, painter, poet, citizen of London, William Blake, towards the fine arts. Blake went further than his eighteenth-century predecessors in respect for their efficacy as missionaries of civilization. He advanced a singular doctrine. They were, he held, the truest interpreters and representatives of Christianity itself. . .

We approach now the main issue. To the arts has been assigned an exalted rank above all other undertakings, a peculiar respect, reverence, authority. They appear to have their natural home in a region impenetrable by reason. They point to a world above our heads, a transcendental world, in which, if anywhere, we may hope to find the fulfilment of our heart's desire. Does such a world exist, or is it a mirage, a lying vision only? Here is the great divide, the momentous parting of the ways in human thought. Here every man must make his choice. Here on one side stand the rationalists, men who decline, like St. Thomas, to advance

beyond the evidence of their senses, to believe until they have seen with their eyes, touched, and handled, the men who put their trust in the human intellect, its findings, and no other. And here in opposition are the men of religion, the poets and artists who place their trust in the inner vision, the intimations of the soul and their affections.

And not only the men of religion and the poets. Listen to Nietzsche, that hard, disillusioned thinker. 'There is in all great art an enigmatic profundity, an infinity of background.' And again: 'The man of philosophic turn has a foreboding that beneath the reality in which we live and move and have our being another altogether different reality lies concealed.' Yes, they have a foreboding not easily exorcized. Keep company with the arts and it will continue to haunt you. They have apparently nothing more than a decorative value and none the less possess a supreme value. They appear to be concerned with matters of no great consequence, and yet, it seems, introduce you to matters of vital consequence. Keep company with them, and without warning, reading a poem, listening to a piece of music, looking at a picture, you may be entangled, as Nietzsche says, in the infinites. One never knows when the heavens may open and in the shock of this bewilderment, face to face with the immeasurable universe, a man looks about him with new awareness, new apprehension. It is then that suddenly the whole scene of existence is perceived in its overwhelming immensity, its true dimensions.

What may or may it not contain? It is then that the values of the fleeting world are weighed in the balance. Even the plain man is exposed to this strange peril. He finds an inexplicable fascination in these enigmatic arts. He may not take them seriously. Yet some secret sympathy, some inborn loyalty draws him, do what he will, to admire, to listen, and to gaze. So at any moment he may be swept away into the deep sea and cannot but enquire, 'What means all this?'

When you enter the temple of the arts you enter a building dedicated to the Muses, and the soul is there disturbed by a sense of how great and terrible, how strange and beautiful, is this universe of ours. Make human life as trivial as you please, there remains the simple, positive, undeniable fact among the other facts—the eating and drinking, walking and talking—that we are taking part in cosmic affairs, of a magnitude beyond all imagination to compass or language to express. All finite things have their roots in the infinite and if you wish to understand life at all, you cannot tear it out of its context. And that context, astonishing even to bodily eyes, is the heaven of stars and the incredible procession of the great galaxies.

In poetry, like its sister arts, you discern—it is common knowledge—not only a peculiar aloofness from life's daily routine, but a singular language. By this idiom the arts are known, the form and grace, the celestial quality, the rhythm of their speech. And what is rhythm, and why celestial?

Celestial since, however it be defined, it is, in fact, the speech of nature and of life. Unseen and unobserved it rules the movements of the heavens, guides the atom and the star, swings the seasons and the days and nights. It illuminates the world in the passage of light, controls the winds and waves, all the organic processes of our bodies, the sleeping and waking, the pulsing of the heart and lungs. The laws of rhythm are the laws that guide the whole fabric of creation, a structure in all its manifestations, the smallest as the greatest. To this voice from the depths, this music of the spheres, the soul, the organ of feeling, as distinguished from the organ of understanding, is attuned. There is, as Aristotle's pregnant sentence expresses it, 'a kind of relationship between the soul and harmonies and rhythms.' All art is tuneful—not music only. A painting, a statue, a building, each in its own manner, is a melodious creation. Have you observed that a tune has a secret virtue, unique and all its own? It is a work of magic. It possesses occult properties. When a tune falls on your ear you respond with instant sympathy. You accept without question the suggested measure, you surrender with what Schopenhauer describes as 'blind consent' to its enchantment, its peculiar spell. You cannot deny, argue with, or contradict a tune. You cannot take another point of view or advance another proposition. The tune is your master, you its spellbound servant. And in the arts the peculiar language is everywhere and by all men understood. It is the

soul's native tongue, and needs no learning.

There is such a thing as an art of life. Civilization may be described as itself a work of art. As in a Gothic minster you have a great building, the work not of one but many minds and hands, so civilization is a work of communal art, which includes and is indebted to them all. It is a piece of racial architecture, a realization, in its law and order, its technique of customs and behaviour, its institutions and ceremonials, of a people's tastes and preferences. It may with truth be regarded as an application to political life, to social intercourse, of the distinction and beauty that delight us in music and poetry. For if beautiful behaviour be not good behaviour, it is something very like it. 'In a thoroughly humanized society,' wrote Santayana, 'everything—clothes, speech, manners, government—is a work of art.' One might, indeed, call its civilization the speaking image of the entire community. In such a society every citizen is himself an artist, and has his share of responsibility as one of its architects.

So far from agreeing with Hegel that 'thought and reflection have taken their flight above fine art' we must submit that, philosopher though he was, he had not attained so much as a glimmering recognition of its true character, or of its transcendent importance in human life. For art is not merely irreplaceable by any other agency. We can with confidence declare that to the arts, which may well be called divine, belongs a glorious privilege. They have made of beauty a guiding star. They have led

mankind on the greatest of all its undertakings and supported it through all the wintry seasons of history. To them we owe the great unwritten principles, the immortal laws that have shaped and guided the conscience of the race. Had Blake been asked, 'Should we be any worse off if these arts were to take wings and forsake this planet altogether?' He would have answered, 'Deny humanity their guidance, and you stab it to the heart. You deprive it of all spiritual interests, you drive it back into the aboriginal abyss, a naked animal, bereft of all its hard-won ethical conceptions, as of justice and equity, of honour and humanity, of law and magnanimity and duty.' How right was Tolstoy when he said: 'Art is a great master, and its task is enormous.'

No one will deny that modern societies, the whole world over, are dominated by cupidity, by greed for possession, for wealth and power. And, as far as I can see, there is no sure shield against the tyranny of this ruinous passion for possession save a transference of our affections, if this be possible, from possession to admiration, from immediate craving for wealth and power to an intense longing for beauty and excellence. Must we for ever continue to think in terms of profit and loss, of all life's lower and lesser interests? As the Greeks knew, 'the beautiful is hard, hard to judge, hard to win, hard to keep.' Yet the love of beauty exists, an admirable passion in every human heart, together with a marvellous capacity for its appreciation. Whatever else be given us, without beauty we can never be at

peace or at rest. In all forms of beauty, mankind will never cease to take delight till the world ends. Nor can better testimony to the significance and worth of the gentle and healing arts be offered than this, that the works of the great masters never grow old. How reluctant is mankind to part from them!

The centuries pass, the generations come and go but in each there springs up once more a passion for the past and all its lovely creations. Though we are gone, Persephone will still gather her flowers in Sicilian Enna, Faust will brood eternally among his books, Hamlet will never cease to ponder the mysteries on the battlements of Elsinore.

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

The new India needs a new outlook. How she can develop a modern attitude to life's problems without throwing overboard all her age-old wisdom and values is the theme of the following passage. And who could be a better counsellor today than her thoughtful and progressive leader, Jawaharlal Nehru? In this passage, which is extracted from his *Discovery of India*, he examines the contributions that religion, philosophy and science can make towards satisfying our spiritual and material needs and developing an integrated vision of life.

India must break with much of her past and not allow it to dominate the present. Our lives are encumbered with the dead wood of this past; all that is dead and has served its purpose has to go. But that does not mean a break with, or a forgetting of, the vital and lifegiving in that past. We can never forget the ideals that have moved our race, the dreams of the Indian people through the ages, the wisdom of the ancients, the buoyant energy and love of life and nature of our forefathers, their spirit of curiosity and mental adventure, the daring of their thought, their splendid achievements in literature, art, and culture, their love of truth and beauty and freedom, the basic values that they set up, their understanding of life's mysterious ways, their toleration of other ways than theirs, their capacity to absorb other peoples and their cultural accomplishments,

synthesize them and develop a varied and mixed culture; nor can we forget the myriad experiences *many* which have built up our ancient race and life embedded in our subconscious minds. We will never forget them or cease to take pride in that noble heritage of ours. If India forgets them she will no longer remain India and much that has made her our joy and pride will cease to be.

It is not this that we have to break with, but with all the dust and dirt of ages that have covered her up and hidden her inner beauty and significance, the excrescences and abortions that have twisted and petrified her spirit, set it in rigid frames, and stunted her growth. We have to cut away these excrescences and remember afresh the core of that ancient wisdom and adapt it to our present circumstances. We have to get out of traditional ways of thought and living which, for all the good they may have done in a past age, and there was much good in them, have ceased to have significance today. We have to make our own all the achievements of the human race and join up with others in the exciting adventure of Man, more exciting today perhaps than in earlier ages, realizing that this has ceased to be governed by national boundaries or old divisions and is common to the race of men everywhere. We have to revive the passion for truth and beauty and freedom which gives meaning to life, and develop afresh that dynamic outlook and spirit of adventure which distinguished those of our race who, in ages past, built our

house on these strong and enduring foundations. Old as we are, with memories stretching back to the early dawns of human history and endeavour, we have to grow young again, in tune with our present time, with the irrepressible spirit and joy of youth in the present and its faith in the future.

Truth, as ultimate reality, if such there is, must be eternal, imperishable, unchanging. But that infinite, eternal and unchanging truth cannot be apprehended in its fulness by the finite mind of man which can only grasp, at most, some small aspect of it limited by time and space, and by the state of development of that mind and the prevailing ideology of the period. As the mind develops and enlarges its scope, as ideologies change and new symbols are used to express that truth, new aspects of it come to light, though the core of it may yet be the same. And so, truth has ever to be sought and renewed, reshaped and developed, so that, as understood by man, it might keep in line with the growth of his thought and the development of human life. Only then does it become a living truth for humanity, supplying the essential need for which it craves, and offering guidance in the present and for the future.

But if some one aspect of the truth has been petrified by dogma in a past age, it ceases to grow and develop and adapt itself to the changing needs of humanity; other aspects of it remain hidden and it fails to answer the urgent questions of a succeeding age. It is no longer dynamic but static, no

longer a life-giving impulse but dead thought and ceremonial and a hindrance to the growth of the mind and of humanity. Indeed, it is probably not even understood to the extent it was understood in that past age when it grew up and was clothed in the language and symbols of that age. For its context is different in a later age, the mental climate has changed, new social habits and customs have grown up, and it is often difficult to understand the sense, much less the spirit, of that ancient writing. Moreover, as Aurobindo Ghose has pointed out, every truth, however true in itself, yet, taken apart from others which at once limit and complete it, becomes a snare to bind the intellect and a misleading dogma; for in reality each is one thread of a complex web and no thread must be taken apart from the web.

Religions have helped greatly in the development of humanity. They have laid down values and standards and have pointed out principles for the guidance of human life. But with all the good they have done, they have also tried to imprison truth in set forms and dogmas, and encouraged ceremonials and practices which soon lose their original meaning and become mere routine. While impressing upon man the awe and mystery of the unknown that surrounds him on all sides, they have discouraged him from trying to understand not only the unknown but what might come in the way of social effort. Instead of encouraging curiosity and thought, they have preached a

philosophy of submission to nature, to the established church, to the prevailing social order, and to everything that is. The belief in a supernatural agency which ordains everything has led to a certain irresponsibility on the social plane, and emotion and sentimentality have taken the place of reasoned thought and inquiry. Religion, though it has undoubtedly brought comfort to innumerable human beings and stabilized society by its values, has checked the tendency to change and progress inherent in human society.

The world of philosophy and imagination
 Philosophy has avoided many of these pitfalls and encouraged thought and inquiry. But it has usually lived in its ivory tower cut off from life and its day-to-day problems, concentrating on ultimate purposes and failing to link them with the life of man. Logic and reason were its guides and they took it far in many directions, but that logic was too much the product of the mind and unconcerned with fact.

Science is without vision through progress
 Science ignored the ultimate purposes and looked at fact alone. It made the world jump forward with a leap, built up a glittering civilization, opened up innumerable avenues for the growth of knowledge, and added to the power of man to such an extent that for the first time it was possible to conceive that man could triumph over and shape his physical environment. Man became almost a geological force, changing the face of the planet earth chemically, physically and in many other ways. Yet when this sorry scheme of

things seemed to be in his grasp, to mould it nearer to the heart's desire, there was some essential lack and some vital element was missing. There was no knowledge of ultimate purposes and not even an understanding of the immediate purpose, for science had told us nothing about any purpose in life. Nor did man, so powerful in his control of nature, have the power to control himself, and the monster ^{uncontrollable} he had created ran amuck. Perhaps new developments in biology, psychology and similar sciences, and the interpretation of biology and physics, may help man to understand and control himself more than he has done in the past. Or before any such advances influence human life sufficiently, man may destroy the civilization he has built and have to start anew.

There is no visible limit to the advance of science, if it is given the chance to advance. Yet it may be that the scientific method of observation is not always applicable to all the varieties of human experience and cannot cross the uncharted ocean that surrounds us. With the help of philosophy it may go a little further and venture even on these high seas. And when both science and philosophy fail us, we shall have to rely on such other powers of apprehension as we may possess. For there appears to be a definite stopping place beyond which reason, as the mind is at present constituted, cannot go. 'La dernière démarche de la raison,' says Pascal, c'est de connaître qu'il y a une infinité de choses qui la surpassent. Elle est bien faible si elle

ne va jusque-là.'

Realizing these limitations of reason and the scientific method, we have still to hold on to them with all our strength, for without that firm basis and background we can have no kind of grip on any kind of truth or reality. It is better to understand a part of truth and apply it to our lives, than to understand nothing at all and flounder helplessly in a vain attempt to pierce the mystery of existence. The applications of science are inevitable and unavoidable for all countries and peoples today. But something more than its application is necessary. It is the scientific approach, the adventurous and yet critical temper of science, the search for truth and new knowledge, the refusal to accept anything without testing and trial, the capacity to change previous conclusions in the face of new evidence, the reliance on observed fact and not on preconceived theory, the hard discipline of the mind—all this is necessary, not merely for the application of science but for life itself and the solution of its many problems. Too many scientists today, who swear by science, forget all about it outside their particular spheres. The scientific approach and temper are, or should be, a way of life, a process of thinking, a method of acting and associating with our fellow-men. That is a large order and undoubtedly very few of us, if any at all, can function in this way with even partial success. But this criticism applies in equal or even greater measure to all the injunctions which philosophy and religion have laid upon us.

Science is the temper of free man.

The scientific temper points out the way along which man should travel. It is the temper of a free man. We live in a scientific age, so we are told, but there is little evidence of this temper in the people anywhere or even in their leaders.

Science deals with the domain of positive knowledge but the temper which it should produce goes beyond that domain. The ultimate purposes of man may be said to be to gain knowledge, to realize truth, to appreciate goodness and beauty. The scientific method of objective inquiry is not applicable to all these and much that is vital in life seems to lie beyond its scope—the sensitiveness to art and poetry, the emotion that beauty produces, the inner recognition of goodness. The botanist and zoologist may never experience the charm and beauty of nature; the sociologist may be wholly lacking in love for humanity. But even when we go to the regions beyond the reach of the scientific method and visit the mountain tops where philosophy dwells and high emotions fill us, or gaze at the immensity beyond, that approach and temper are still necessary.

Very different is the method of religion. Concerned as it is principally with the regions beyond the reach of objective inquiry, it relies on emotion and intuition. And then it applies this method to everything in life, even to those things which are capable of inquiry and observation. Organized religion, allying itself to theology and often more concerned with its vested interests than with things

of the spirit, encourages a temper which is the very opposite to that of science. It produces narrowness and intolerance, credulity and superstition, emotionalism and irrationalism. It tends to close and limit the mind of man, and to produce the temper of a dependent, unfree person.

Even if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him, as Voltaire said—'si dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer.' Perhaps that is true and indeed the mind of man has always been trying to fashion some such mental image or conception which grew with the mind's growth. But there is something also in the reverse proposition: even if God exists, it may be desirable not to look up to Him or to rely upon Him. Too much dependence on supernatural factors may lead, and has often led, to a loss of self-reliance in man and to a blunting of his capacity and creative ability. And yet some faith seems necessary in things of the spirit which are beyond the scope of our physical world, some reliance on moral, spiritual and idealistic conceptions, or else we have no anchorage, no objective or purpose in life. Whether we believe in God or not, it is impossible not to believe in something, whether we call it a creative life-giving force, or vital energy inherent in matter which gives it its capacity for self-movement and change and growth, or by some other name, something that is as real, though elusive, as life is real when contrasted with death. Whether we are conscious of it or not, most of us worship at the invisible altar of some

Just

unknown god and offer sacrifices to it—some ideal, personal, national or international; some distant objective that draws us on, though reason itself may find little substance to it; some vague conception of a perfect man and a better world. Perfection may be impossible of attainment, but the demon in us, some vital force, urges us on and we tread that path from generation to generation.

As knowledge advances, the domain of religion in the narrow sense of the word, shrinks. The more we understand life and nature, the less we look for supernatural causes. Whatever we can understand and control ceases to be a mystery. The processes of agriculture, the food we eat, the clothes we wear, our social relations, were all at one time under the dominion of religion and its high priests. Gradually they have passed out of its control and become subjects for scientific study. Yet much of this is still powerfully affected by religious beliefs and the superstitions that accompany them. The final mysteries still remain far beyond the reach of the human mind and are likely to continue to remain so. But so many of life's mysteries are capable of and await solution that an obsession with the final mystery seems hardly necessary or justified. Life still offers not only the loveliness of the world but also the exciting adventure of fresh and never-ceasing discoveries, of new panoramas opening out and new ways of living, adding to its fullness and ever making it richer and more complete.

It is therefore with the temper and approach

of science, allied to philosophy, and with reverence for all that lies beyond, that we must face life. Thus we may develop an integral vision of life which embraces in its wide scope the past and the present, with all their heights and depths, and look with serenity towards the future. The depths are there and cannot be ignored, and always by the side of the loveliness that surrounds us is the misery of the world. Man's journey through life is an odd mixture of joy and sorrow; thus only can he learn and advance. The travail of the soul is a tragic and lonely business. External events and their consequences affect us powerfully, and yet the greatest shocks come to our minds through inner fears and conflicts. While we advance on the external plane, as we must if we are to survive, we have also to win peace with ourselves and between ourselves and our environment, a peace which brings satisfaction not only to our physical and material needs but also to those inner imaginative urges and adventurous spirit that have distinguished man ever since he started on his troubled journey in the realms of thought and action. Whether that journey has any ultimate purpose or not we do not know, but it has its compensations, and it points to many a nearer objective which appears attainable and which may again become the starting point for a fresh advance.

Science has dominated the western world and everyone there pays tribute to it, and yet the West is still far from having developed the real temper

of science. It has still to bring the spirit and the flesh into creative harmony. In India in many obvious ways we have a greater distance to travel. And yet there may be fewer major obstructions on our way, for the essential basis of Indian thought for ages past, though not its later manifestations, fits in with the scientific temper and approach, as well as with internationalism. It is based on a fearless search for truth, on the solidarity of man, even on the divinity of everything living, and on the free and co-operative development of the individual and the species, ever to greater freedom and to higher stages of human growth.)

SCIENCE AND THE MODERN MIND

RICHARD LIVINGSTONE

This is admittedly an age of science. Science has entered into the very texture of our thought. But may this not have had as well as good results? In the following extract a distinguished educationist, while not overlooking the debt which our generation owes to science, draws our attention to some of the dangers to which it exposes us. What is reproduced below is substantially the fifth chapter, entitled "Science", of Sir Richard Livingstone's book, *Education and the Spirit of the Age* (1932).

Our age is a child of liberalism and rationalism. But it has another parent, whose influence has been even more important, is growing, and will continue to grow—science, in its pure and applied forms. I shall use the word mainly in the restricted sense which we give it, though I regret our loss of the wider and more philosophic Greek view, to which science was the knowledge, not merely of the material and physical world, but of all that concerned man. I shall say nothing of the virtues and benefits of natural science, which are obvious. Apart from its material benefits it is self-justified. 'All men by nature desire to know. . . . The feeling of wonder in men originally gave rise to philosophy and gives rise to it today; their interest was first excited by obvious problems, then advanced little by little and raised problems about the greater

matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun, and about the stars and about the genesis of the universe. Since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end.' To be indifferent to science is to disown a fundamental human instinct which calls into action the great virtues not only of the intellect but of the character. It is to refuse the inexhaustible material gifts of science, which have already added so much to the health, resources, and powers of man, and, until the internal combustion engine and atomic energy put into our hands an unlimited power of destruction, to his security.

There is little risk that we shall overlook the uses of science or our debt to it; but because we recognize them, it is possible, even more than with liberalism, to ignore the dangers and problems which it has created, and it is of these that I propose to speak. For one thing, it has upset our international relations by annihilating space. As we are so often reminded, it has abolished distance, made the five continents adjacent countries, and unified the world. At the beginning of the nineteenth century a letter took weeks, in favourable circumstances, to reach America, and its arrival was uncertain. Today we can speak from London to a friend in New York within fifteen minutes and be with him in twelve hours. We can get from the United States, from the Argentine, from the Antipodes, the food which a hundred years ago we

had to grow at home, and it has become both more abundant and, in certain circumstances, more precarious. (Mr. Baldwin was thought paradoxical when he said that the frontier of Britain was on the Rhine: it would be truer to say that it has disappeared.) Clearly in such conditions the international relations of the past are an anachronism, and fit the body politic as ill as the clothes of a child fit a grown man. But we have not yet developed the outlook demanded by modern conditions, and we still keep the isolated, provincial mind of an earlier age to which steam and electricity were unknown. Nor is it easy to change our view. The adult immigrant into America from eastern or southern Europe, even though transplanted into a new world far from his old life and surroundings, still retains much of the outlook and habits of his past:

'Caelum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt.'

How much more difficult it is for the European in Europe to detach himself from the traditions in which he has grown up and from the atmosphere which he breathes! Psychiatry on a colossal scale is needed, if we are to adapt our minds to the new political philosophy which the change wrought by natural science in our conditions demands.

Another problem created by science may be described as *embarras de richesses*. It has abolished poverty or at least has given us the power to abolish

it, but this virtue has a defect which passes unnoticed. We are like *nouveaux riches*, who have come into a fortune but are too uneducated to spend it intelligently. Every capacity is a capacity for evil as well as for good, and each addition to human power is a chance to misuse it, which men are quick to seize. Take printing as an example, and put into one scale the access to wisdom, knowledge, and beauty which it has made possible, and into the other the falsehood, corruption, and rubbish which the printing-press has distributed to men: the latter scale would far outbalance the former, if good did not weigh heavier than evil. Further, the very wealth of objects and enjoyments, good and bad, useful and useless, which applied science has put at the disposal of a world that has not yet learnt to choose good and refuse evil, is a menace to true civilization. Give a small child ten shillings and take it into a well-stocked shop to spend the money, and watch it, distracted by this wealth of opportunity, take up one toy and drop it for another, and finally leave with something with which next day it will be disappointed; it does not know what it wants, still less what it ought to want. There you have a picture of many human beings in the presence of the abundance which technology has lavished on us, and a minor example of what Christ meant by the deceitfulness of riches. Needless to say, the fullest use is made of our weakness by advertisement, that peculiar development of the technological age. Its trumpet blows equally loudly the praises of the

pervasive, dominated western civilization for centuries. New knowledge in astronomy proved that the earth is an infinitesimal fraction in the universe and not the centre of it. New knowledge in geology proved that it was not created some 5,000 years ago but has existed for millions of centuries. New knowledge in biology proved that the views of the origin of man, originating in Babylon, perhaps as far back as the twenty-second century B.C., and adopted in the Book of Genesis are—and it is not surprising—wrong. These discoveries are not as catastrophic as they appear and are still sometimes thought to be. The answer to the first was given by Thomas Hardy, who watching the 'panoramic glide of the stars' reflected that 'the consciousness of such majestic speeding is derived from a tiny human frame'; and, earlier and more profoundly, by Pascal, who wrote, '*Le silence eternal de ces espaces infinis m'effraie*', but then reflected: '*Toute notre dignité consiste en la pensée. C'est de la qu'il faut nous relever et non de l'espace et la durée, que nous ne saurions remplir.*'

The true lessons from this episode in the history of human thought are that we may expect our views of the universe to change, but that these changes, if they are peripheral and not central, need not alter our fundamental beliefs, and that theology should confine itself to its own business and not undertake the work of astronomy, geology, or other branches of knowledge—pronouncements by any science on matters lying outside its own province

are always rash and generally wrong. Still, in fact and for the moment, we are living in a world of shaken beliefs in which few except Christians and Communists know where they stand. When beliefs are false they must be discarded and no one can regret their disappearance. But that does not lessen the immediate crisis. This is the most difficult age in history. We have to master atomic energy; we have to see that civilization is enriched and not cheapened by the indiscriminate gifts of technology; and all the while the most difficult problems, economic, social, political, and moral are pressing for solution. This is no moment to find ourselves with broken standards and uncertain principles. It is ill crossing a river in flood if you are not firm on your feet.

Thus science has raised new political problems, exposed us to new temptations, and at the same time thrown our minds into confusion. Yet, though in detail its conclusions may change, there is no going back on science itself: we must go forward, and extend its empire, 'following the argument where it leads'. Any great new force that comes into the world is revolutionary, and for the moment upsets and confuses the minds of men. That was as true of Christianity as it is of science; it too was a disruptive force in the world, as its Founder warned His followers: 'I am come not to send peace but a sword. . . I came to cast fire upon the earth.' Now, as then, men have to accept the new revelation, providing against dangers that accompany it.

For that . . . we need a policy; and for an effective policy we need clear and firm beliefs.

Hitherto I have been speaking of the direct and obvious impact of natural science on the world, the political problems which it has brought above the horizon, the opportunities of misuse which its gifts allow, its disturbing effect on our traditional outlook and views of life. But more important, and much more likely to escape our notice, is its subtle indirect influence on the modern mind, the results of living in an atmosphere largely dominated by it. Great ideas run away with men, and there is no trait more constant in human nature than its habit of pursuing a truth beyond its proper province: a history of civilization might almost be written in terms, first of the discovery of great truths, and then of their exaggeration. That is a danger of which the Greeks were more aware than we, as is shown by their favourite proverb 'Nothing in excess', and their inclusion of 'balance' in the list of cardinal virtues. It can be illustrated from the history of Christianity. Dominated by the new 'good tidings' of the Gospel, many of its followers undervalued, or even rejected altogether, the gifts of secular civilization; and, later, looked in the Bible for answers to questions which science alone could solve. In what direction may science run away with us, throw us off our balance, hinder us from seeing the world with clear eyes?

It would be easier to answer these questions, if we knew better the effects on the mind of the study

of different subjects, and an exact analysis of these is badly needed. What is the psychological effect of studying natural science? When we ask this question, we are apt to be dismissed with vague phrases, to be told that it gives the student a scientific attitude to life or that it trains the mind to be critical and objective. The first of these statements is vague and the second is clearly untrue. In his own field the scientist is no doubt rigidly objective: he collects the facts relevant to a problem and makes no conclusions that the facts do not justify. But, outside his subject and where his emotions are involved, he is no more objective or less liable to prejudice than the rest of us. Further the 'scientific' approach to a subject is not confined to natural science but is necessary in every field of study and habitual in any serious student. An historian would be justly annoyed if you suggested that he was unscientific; so would an economist; so would a sociologist. In any subject from chemistry to archaeology, from *kulturgeschichte* to politics, the scientific method consists in ascertaining the facts and deciding what conclusions can legitimately be drawn from them. (What more does the study of physics and chemistry do to discipline people in scientific method and to train them to be objective, than the study of history or economics?)

The method of natural science is to ascertain facts, to grasp them accurately, and to find explanations for them: and, in so far, it is a training in observation, in precision, in objectivity, and in a

rational habit of mind ; though these qualities may not necessarily be transferred outside its special field, and are also trained by serious study of any subject. But there is something more important still, where natural science has a special advantage. It introduces us to the material world and thereby widens immensely the horizon of the mind, extends its range, gives it a sense of infinite possibilities, and makes life more interesting and alive. It is rare to find a scientist who is pessimistic or defeatist, for he lives in an atmosphere of progress, of creation, with the promise of a heaven—at least on earth. Natural science is creative and forward-looking. The scientist is an explorer of an unknown world with infinite possibilities of discovery ; and not only is the act of discovery exciting, but it leads on to action, to practical results. It seeks to know, but also to transform, the world, and this is a further excitement and stimulus to those who follow it. No other subject has these qualities to quite the same extent, though they should be present in politics and sociology, where there are immense areas waiting to be explored.

We should expect this creative, forward-looking, practical character of natural science to have a further effect on the mind. In past days I used to attend meetings of Faculties of Arts, of Science, and of Medicine, and I was struck by a certain difference of atmosphere between them. Faced with a Gordian knot, the instinct of the former was to untie it, of the latter to cut it. The 'artists' (if I may coin

a word) turned a flood of criticism on the question and were concerned to get to the bottom of it and see it in all its relations and possibilities, until action was sometimes submerged in a mounting tide of doubts and difficulties. I came to the conclusion that the ideal committee would be composed, as to one-third, of 'artists', to ensure that the problem was fully analysed, and, as to two-thirds, of scientists, to ensure that something was done. A training in natural science would seem likely to foster in the mind the temper and ideal of Burke: 'To be fully persuaded, that all virtue which is impracticable is spurious; and rather to run the risk of falling into faults in a course which leads us to act with effect and energy, than to loiter out our days without blame and without use. . . . Life is a position of power and energy.'

On the other hand, a purely scientific education, uncorrected by other influences, has a narrowing effect. Natural science seems so all-embracing, that we do not notice that vast regions of life—and these the most important—do not come within its view, and a mind dominated by it would naturally be inclined to ignore or underestimate them. 'It has little to say about those creations of the human spirit which alone are immortal, great literature or great art. When we read Homer or Dante or Shakespeare, listen to a symphony of Beethoven, gaze at the Parthenon or the paintings in the Sistine Chapel, natural science has little light to throw on what we feel or why we feel it. . . . It is dumb if we

ask it to explain the greatest human works or emotions or experiences,

Exultations, agonies,
And love, and Man's unconquerable mind.

Here we are in a mysterious yet familiar world which belongs to religion, poetry, and art, but not to science. Hence Whitehead's insistence that we should 'urge the doctrines of Science beyond their *delusive air of finality*.'

The chief limitation of natural science is that it is not human. But we have to live with human beings—including ourselves—and nearly all the problems of life are human, whereas the problems and subject-matter of physics, chemistry, and biology are not. When we enter their laboratories, we find little human there, except ourselves and our fellow workers. We are in a world of cells, elements, atoms (or whatever substitute for them the latest analysis reveals). There are obvious dangers in living in such a world. It is too unlike the world of men to be a good preparation for it: the fundamental reality in that world is human personality: the ideal society is a community of such personalities, self-controlling, self-developing, self-respecting, and respecting others. But natural science is not concerned with personality, at least in this sense and in these relations: and there is a risk that when we return to the human world, we may be inclined to ignore its difference from the laboratory, and even to treat men as if they were elements

or cells. It is perhaps their training which explains why some scientists are sympathetic with Communism.

Some people turn to Communism, as others turn to the Roman Catholic Church, because it is a world religion, offers them a positive faith in an age of scepticism, makes their decisions for them, and, once accepted, relieves them of the painful task of thinking for themselves. In self-surrender they find themselves. Materialistic scientists are attracted to Communism for a different reason. Its drastic methods resemble those which they use in their laboratories with their animate and inanimate material, with atoms and cells, manipulating and controlling them in the interest of a great overriding end. It is this control and manipulation that makes the triumphs of science possible; and it seems natural to apply a similar technique to social and political problems, and so achieve more rapid and effective results than the tedious methods of persuasion allow. This technique appears to offer the quickest way to a better and more rational world, and in so good a cause it seems wrong to be too tender with individual personalities and consciences. For what is the short-lived individual in comparison with the race? That attitude, very different from the Christian belief that each individual, however stupid, however humble, has an equal value in the sight of God, is too alien from Anglo-Saxon temperament and traditions to have secured a hold in Britain or America, but it was an accepted principle

in Nazi Germany and is evident in Communist Russia. No one can complain if a materialist adopts it, for it is a natural conclusion from materialist premises.

I have suggested that an education in natural science is likely to encourage a forward-looking and active temper of mind, but that, uncorrected and unsupplemented, it gives an inadequate view of the world, and that living and dealing with atoms and cells is no preparation for living and dealing with men. All intelligent scientists are aware of these dangers, and are as anxious as anyone that science should not overweight the curriculum but be combined with humanistic studies, so that education may produce balanced human beings.

More dangerous because more subtle and less obvious is another limitation of science, an attitude to the world which, if uncorrected, induces a cramping effect on the mind, which is a widespread weakness of our civilization, but is often unnoticed.

This is an age of analysis, as any age of thought must be. Chemistry resolves matter into elements, physics resolves it into atoms (or whatever has taken the atom's place), biology resolves organic life into cells. But the method is not confined to natural science, and for the rest of this chapter I shall be thinking of science, not in the restricted sense of natural science but in this wider meaning of the term—the analytic spirit, which is characteristic of any kind of scientific inquiry in any field. When we say that the temper of modern civilization is

scientific we mean not only that natural science engages a large part of its thoughts and determines much of its life, but that our civilization is scientific in the sense in which the Greeks used philosophy, that it 'loves wisdom', that in all fields it desires to seek knowledge and make knowledge its servant and its master. So literary studies employ the scientific method, so far as their subject-matter allows ; a writer is 'explained' in terms of his ancestry, his early life, his education, the character of his age, the influences social, intellectual, and other, which have shaped his outlook and intellect, his subconscious mind, his Oedipus complexes and psychic traumata. Coleridge writes a great lyric of 54 lines, *Kubla Khan*. An American professor devotes a brilliant book of 600 pages to tracing the genesis and contents of the poem. That is only a notable example of what in one way or another literary critics are doing in every country ; and, in every field of study knowledge and understanding grow by the use of these techniques. They invade literature itself and produce the psychological novel where the skeleton and nerves of the characters are so visible that these seem animated automata and not live men and women, and we say that they have been drawn from outside and not from within. Here, as in the other instances, a penalty is paid for the increase of knowledge. Something is revealed, something is obscured ; something learnt, but something lost.

May not the dominance of the analytical spirit explain why there are innumerable historical works

but very little great history? The modern historian analyses events into their causes—into economic, demographic, geographic facts, into the impact of contemporary thought or the impact of individuals. He provides indispensable materials for a history that is never written. He analyses events and persons and explains them, but he fails to bring them to life. The actors in his pages are like the painted figures of historical frescoes in a Town hall or a Parliament building; we never feel them to be human beings with the same passions as ourselves. Only occasionally a writer appears who does the necessary analytic work on his subject and then so puts the results together that the reader is conscious not of parts but of a whole, not merely of dead facts but of life, not merely of an intellectual construction but of reality.

So too in the field of literature never has the general level of writing been as high as it is today and never have there been more writers—*litterarum intemperantia laboramus* as Seneca said of the first century of the Roman Empire—but there are few for whom immortality can be confidently predicted. May it not be that a mind sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought is less likely to feel the intense and fresh impact of reality, from which great creation springs? Whether this is so or not—and speculations about genius are mere speculation—there is no doubt that the mood and atmosphere of great literature is not analytic, and in general, analysis seems alien, if not positively hostile, to great creative work.

There are indeed writers of genius—Euripides, Wordsworth, Coleridge, for instance—who analyse and reflect, so to speak before our eyes. But the analytical, reflective passages are never the greatest passages in their works. In the *Prelude* it is the scene near

A naked pool that lay beneath the hills, and the vision when the mist clears away on Snowdon, not the thoughts which these suggest, that are the poet's chief gift to the world. In Coleridge it is not the *Ode to Dejection*, still less *Religious Musings* that are immortal, but *The Ancient Mariner* and *Kubla Khan*. It is the same with novelists. We may enjoy and admire the intellectual subtleties of Henry James and Virginia Woolf but we recognize something far rarer and higher in *War and Peace* and *The Brothers Karamazov*, and in these the greatness lies not in the incidental reflections, which are an excrescence that would be better away, but in characters, scenes, and situations as living as life itself. Yet few men have had a more analytical mind than Tolstoy. But the gift of a great writer to the world lies not in his thoughts but in his vision: analysis and hard thinking may, and no doubt do, underlie his work but they are fused and forgotten in the hour of creation. That is why we speak of great literature as 'imaginative' or 'inspired', never as 'intellectual'.

Our civilization is increasingly built on analysis; it is the habit of mind which our higher education

tends to produce, and the intellectual atmosphere which we breathe, and so its effects pass unnoticed. I am not criticizing it but pointing out its limitations; in places where its techniques are practised, a line of Wordsworth should be written up in large letters, as a warning of dangers that attend analysis,

We murder to dissect.

The parts, even if they are complete, are not the same as the whole. Dissolved into atoms, the solid world is no longer itself. Reduced to cells or to an amalgam of psychological impulses, human beings 'no more *make* that whole which commands our devotion, than some shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful'. Analyse a thing and the life leaves it, but life is the most important thing in the world, and analysis not only does not help us to see it, but it encourages us—so potent and interesting and engrossing is it—to forget the existence of what it cannot reveal.

I remember the impression produced on my mind when, as an undergraduate, I read a famous work of literary analysis, Aristotle's *Poetics*. Here was a brilliant and illuminating account of literature, of poetic diction, of tragedy—its function, its structure, of the place in it of plot and character, of the nature of the ideal tragic hero; but there was not a word in it of poetry as I understood it. I had been given a critique which I could apply to *King*

Lear or to any great drama; if I used it, I could judge them better. But I was not helped to appreciate them, if appreciation means not accurate dissection but a sense of their greatness, of that impact which a masterpiece, as a whole, makes on the imagination. Aristotle apparently was not interested in that. The *Poetics* is a great piece of analytical criticism but you could read it without learning what poetry is.

To describe what is missing in analysis I have been using phrases such as life, reality, imagination, sense of the whole. What is at the bottom of this distinction? What is the difference between poetry as it is seen in a great work of analysis like Aristotle's *Poetics*, and in poetry itself? What do we miss if we analyse perfectly a poem, an historical event, a human character, a flower, a piece of music, a work of art, and stop there, resting content in our analysis? At bottom this is a metaphysical question for philosophers to answer, but one can at least see certain facts. (Mere analysis, however exact and complete, misses something and that the most important thing. There is a double road to truth, the road of analysis and what we may call the road of intuition, and the first road only takes us part of the way.) We have to see that Shakespeare is a great poet and Michael Angelo a great sculptor, the Parthenon a great building; we have to see that St. Paul's words about love in the 13th chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians are true. No amount of argument or

analysis will prove these things, unless we perceive them and perceive them to be so. No analysis of the technique embodied in the Parthenon, no talk of entasis or asymmetry will help us. And if someone says that Shakespeare is inferior to Shaw or Michael Angelo to Henry Moore, or the Parthenon to the London University building, or love to efficiency or to knowledge, there is no way of convincing him or proving that he is wrong. 'Questions of ends', said Bertrand Russell, 'are not amenable to rational argument', and the same is true of the most important things in life. The road that leads to reality is the road of vision. The penalty of not using the road is to miss reality.

Two great writers, who combined analytical with imaginative genius, have spoken of the danger to which the analytical mind is exposed. It is the subject of a poem by Ibsen, which portrays the thinker under the image of a miner;

Beetling rock with roar and smoke
Break before my hammer-stroke!
Deeper I must thrust and lower,
Till I hear the ring of ore.

There you have the analytical thinker digging deeper and deeper into his subject. But in the end

I lost the sense of light
In the poring womb of night;
Woodland songs, when earth rejoiced her,
Breathed not down my hollow cloister.

In less enigmatic words Ruskin expresses the same loss of 'the sense of light' when he describes the mood that came upon him after minute study of the details of Gothic architecture in Venice. 'I went through so much hard, dry, mechanical toil there that I quite lost the charm of the place. Analysis is an abominable business. I am quite sure that people who work out subjects thoroughly are disagreeable wretches. One only feels as one should, when one doesn't know much of the matter . . . I lost all *feeling* of Venice.'

But we need not go to Ruskin and Ibsen to learn about the dangers which attend the analytical habit of mind. Every school illustrates them. 'In the garden of Eden Adam saw the animals before he named them: in the traditional system (of education) the children name the animals before they see them.' The pupil masters a text-book on botany, but may never have seen a flower in the sense that Wordsworth saw a daisy or Bridges saw a sea poppy or Tennyson saw the 'flower in the crannied wall'; they may remain unaware of its beauty and mystery. As Whitehead says, 'When you understand all about the sun, and all about the atmosphere, and all about the radiation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance of the sunset.' Yet of these two forms of knowledge, both real, the second is the more profound. It belongs to what Whitehead calls 'the deeper intuitions of the human spirit.'

Analysis deludes us into thinking that we know all about things whose inner reality we miss. It

was said of an eminent statesman that his weakness was a tendency to suppose that an analysis of a problem was the same thing as a solution of it. It may be said of the modern world that it is apt to suppose an analysis of something to be identical with knowledge of it, whereas it is only a step to real knowledge. The habit of analysis accustoms us to be content with a view of the world which seems complete and is not.

But it has another danger. Uncorrected, it actually weakens the habit of mind which gives a fuller and farther vision. It contributes to our materialism by destroying our sense of wonder. 'Wonder possesses me as I see' is a recurring phrase in Homer. . . There speaks the poet, and the man to whom this wonder comes most often, who feels thus most intensely about the greatest number of human experiences, is the man who sees and knows most of the universe. But it is just this sense in which we are apt to be deficient. Awe, reverence, mystery (except in connexion with a crime) are not words characteristic of our time. Ruskin said: 'the tree of knowledge is not the tree of life': 'We live to contemplate, enjoy, act, adore, and we may know all that there is to be known without being able to do any of these'. Our age understands knowledge and action; it regards contemplation as a waste of time; it has a narrow view of enjoyment; and adoration means little to it. The highest powers in man are a trinity—knowledge, love, and worship: strong in the first, we are weakest in the last two of

these. The spirit of analysis, uncorrected fosters our weakness and impoverishes the mind; it has 'explained' all things or is on the way to 'explain' them, and their mystery withers away. We forget that the mystery has merely been pushed back beyond the range of our short sight and remains at the heart of things.

An idle poet here and there,
Looks round him, but for all the rest
The world, unfathomably fair,
Is duller than a witling's jest.

We live among marvels and never notice them.

Uneasy stirrings reveal the disquiet of the human spirit with conditions in which it cannot rest, and of such stirrings there have been many in recent years. Instincts suppressed, needs unsatisfied always make themselves felt and a reaction against the purely analytic spirit of the age appears in many forms. It can be seen in Nietzsche's later writings, in Bergson's philosophy of the *élan vital*, in the theology of Kierkegaard and Karl Barth, in existentialism, in the thought—if it can be called 'thought'—of D. H. Lawrence, in surrealism. To it we should attribute an irrationalism which has been more aggressive and clamant in this rational age than in any other epoch in history, and which in politics is illustrated by Hitler and the Nazi philosophy. We are too annoyed by these violent winds which disturb the intellectual atmosphere to ask

where they take their rise and we dismiss them as irrational—as indeed they are. But there is more to them than that. Like romantic movements in literature—and in a sense they can be called romantic—they warn us of something deficient and incomplete in our outlook; and they contain an element which human nature needs. . .

Our task is to accept what is true in these movements of the mind and to reject what is false; to remain rational and yet to be aware of a world beyond reason.

THE ETHICS OF POWER

BERTRAND RUSSELL

The use and abuse of power is a question very much to the fore in this century of dictators, concentration camps and mass murders. For, unfortunately, those who are powerful are not always humane or wise. In the following extract from *Power: A New Social Analysis*, published in 1940, Bertrand Russell, one of the foremost philosophers of our day, defines the limits within which power may be legitimately exercised.

Love of power, in its widest sense, is the desire to be able to produce intended effects upon the outer world, whether human or non-human. This desire is an essential part of human nature, and in energetic men it is a very large and important part. Every desire, if it cannot be instantly gratified, brings about a wish for the ability to gratify it, and therefore some form of the love of power. This is true of the best desires as well as the worst. If you love your neighbour, you will wish for power to make him happy. To condemn all love of power, therefore, is to condemn love of your neighbour.

There is, however, a great difference between power desired as a means and power desired as an end in itself. The man who desires power as a means has first some other desire, and is then led to wish that he were in a position to achieve it. The man who desires power as an end will choose his

objective by the possibility of securing it. In politics, for example, one man wishes to see certain measures enacted, and is thus led to take part in public affairs, while another man, wishing only for personal success, adopts whatever programme seems most likely to lead to this result.

(Christ's third temptation in the wilderness illustrates this distinction.) He is offered all the kingdoms of the earth if He will fall down and worship Satan; that is to say, He is offered power to achieve certain objects, but not those that He has in view. This temptation is one to which almost every modern man is exposed, sometimes in a gross form, sometimes in a very subtle one. He may, though a Socialist, accept a position on a Conservative newspaper; this is a comparatively gross form. He may despair of the achievement of Socialism by peaceful means, and become a Communist, not because he thinks that what he wants will be achieved in this way, but because he thinks that something will be achieved. To advocate unsuccessfully what he wants seems to him more futile than to advocate successfully what he does not want. But if his wants, other than personal success, are strong and definite, there will be no satisfaction to his sense of power unless those wants are satisfied, and to change his objects for the sake of success will seem to him an act of apostasy which might be described as worshipping Satan.

Love of power, if it is to be beneficent, must be bound up with some end other than power. I do

not mean that there must be no love of power for its own sake, for this motive is sure to arise in the course of an active career; I mean that the desire for some other end must be so strong that power is unsatisfying unless it ministers to this end.

It is not enough that there should be a purpose other than power; it is necessary that this purpose should be one which, if achieved, will help to satisfy the desires of others. If you aim at discovery, or artistic creation, or the invention of a labour-saving machine, or the reconciliation of groups hitherto at enmity with each other, your success, if you succeed, is likely to be a cause of satisfactions to others besides yourself. This is the second condition that love of power must fulfil if it is to be beneficent: it must be linked to some purpose which is, broadly speaking, in harmony with the desires of the other people who will be affected if the purpose is realized.

There is a third condition, somewhat more difficult to formulate. The means of realizing your purpose must not be such as will incidentally have bad effects outweighing the excellence of the end to be achieved. Every man's character and desires undergo perpetual modification as a result of what he does and what he suffers. Violence and injustice breed violence and injustice, both in those who inflict them and in their victims. Defeat, if it is incomplete, breeds rage and hatred, while if it is complete it breeds apathy and inaction. Victory by force produces ruthlessness and contempt for the

vanquished, however exalted may have been the original motives for war. All these considerations, while they do not prove that no good purpose can ever be achieved by force, do show that force is very dangerous, and that when there is very much of it any original good purpose is likely to be lost sight of before the end of the strife.

The existence of civilized communities, however, is impossible without some element of force, since there are criminals and men of anti-social ambitions who, if unchecked, would soon cause a reversion to anarchy and barbarism. Where force is unavoidable, it should be exerted by the constituted authority in accordance with the will of the community as expressed in the criminal law. There are, however, two difficulties at this point: first, that the most important uses of force are between different States, where there is no common government and no effectively acknowledged law of judicial authority; second, that the concentration of force in the hands of the government enables it, to some extent, to tyrannize over the rest of the community. Each of these difficulties I shall consider in the next chapter. In the present chapter I am considering power in relation to individual morality, not in relation to the government.

Love of power, like lust, is such a strong motive that it influences most men's actions more than they think it should. It may therefore be argued that the ethic which will produce the best consequences will be one more hostile to love of

power than reason can justify: since men are pretty sure to sin against their own code in the direction of the pursuit of power, their acts, it may be said, will be about right if their code is somewhat too severe. A man who is propounding an ethical doctrine can, however, hardly allow himself to be influenced by such considerations, since, if he does, he is obliged to lie consciously in the interests of virtue. The desire to be edifying rather than truthful is the bane of preachers and educators: and whatever may be said in its favour theoretically, it is in practice unmitigatedly harmful. We must admit that men have acted badly from love of power, and will continue to do so; but we ought not, on this account, to maintain that love of power is undesirable in forms and circumstances in which we believe it to be beneficial or at least innocuous.

The forms that a man's love of power will take depend upon his temperament, his opportunities, and his skill; his temperament, moreover, is largely moulded by his circumstances. To turn an individual's love of power into specified channels is, therefore, a matter of providing him with the right circumstances, the right opportunities, and the appropriate type of skill. This leaves out of account the question of congenital disposition, which, in so far as it is amenable to treatment, is a matter for eugenics; but it is probably only a small percentage of the population that cannot be led, by the above means, to choose some useful form of activity.

To begin with circumstances as affecting temperament: the source of cruel impulses is usually to be found either in an unfortunate childhood, or in experiences, such as those of civil war, in which suffering and death are frequently seen and inflicted; absence of any legitimate outlet for energy in adolescence and early youth may have the same effect. I believe that few men are cruel if they have had a wise early education, have not lived among scenes of violence, and have not had undue difficulty in finding a career. Given these conditions, most men's love of power will prefer, if it can, to find a beneficent or at least harmless outlet.

The question of opportunity has both a positive and a negative aspect: it is important that there shall not be opportunity for the career of a pirate, or a brigand, or a dictator, as well as that there should be opportunity for a less destructive profession. There must be a strong government, to prevent the possibility of legal forms of brigandage and to offer attractive careers to as many young people as possible. This is much easier in a community which is growing richer than in one which is growing poorer. Nothing improves the moral level of a community as much as an increase of wealth, and nothing lowers it so much as a diminution of wealth. The harshness of the general outlook from the Rhine to the Pacific at the present day is very largely due to the fact that so many people are poorer than their parents were.)

The importance of skill in determining the

form taken by love of power is very great. Destruction, broadly speaking, apart from certain forms of modern war, requires very little skill, whereas construction always requires some, and in the highest forms requires a great deal. Most men who have acquired a difficult type of skill enjoy exercising it, and prefer this activity to easier ones; this is because the difficult kind of skill, other things being equal, is more satisfying to love of power. The man who has learnt to throw bombs from an aeroplane will prefer this to the humdrum occupations that will be open to him in peace time; but the man who has learnt (say) to combat yellow fever will prefer this to the work of an army surgeon in war time. Modern war involves a very great deal of skill, and this helps to make it attractive to various kinds of experts. Much scientific skill is needed equally in peace and in war; there is no way by which a scientific pacifist can make sure that his discoveries or inventions will not be used to increase the destruction in the next struggle. Nevertheless, there is, speaking broadly, a distinction between the kinds of skill that find most scope in peace and those that find most scope in war. In so far as such a distinction exists, a man's love of power will incline him to peace if his skill is of the former kind, and to war if it is of the latter. (In such ways, technical training can do much to determine what form love of power shall take.)

It is not altogether true that persuasion is one thing and force is another. Many forms of

persuasion—even many of which everybody approves—are really a kind of force. Consider what we do to our children. We do not say to them: “Some people think the earth is round, and others think it is flat; when you grow up, you can, if you like, examine the evidence and form your own conclusion.” Instead of this we say: “The earth is round.” By the time our children are old enough to examine the evidence, our propaganda has closed their minds, and the most persuasive arguments of the Flat Earth Society make no impression. The same applies to the moral precepts that we consider really important, such as “don’t pick your nose” or “don’t eat peas with a knife.” There may, for aught I know, be admirable reasons for eating peas with a knife, but the hypnotic effect of early persuasion has made me completely incapable of appreciating them.

The ethics of power cannot consist in distinguishing some kinds of power as legitimate and others as illegitimate. As we have just seen, we all approve, in certain cases, of a kind of persuasion which is essentially a use of force. Almost everybody would approve of physical violence, even killing, in easily imagined conditions. Suppose you had come upon Guy Fawkes in the very act of firing the train, and suppose you could only have prevented the disaster by shooting him; most pacifists, even, would admit that you would have done right to shoot. The attempt to deal with the question by abstract general principles, praising acts of one type

and blaming acts of another, is futile; we must judge the exercise of power by its effects, and we must therefore first make up our minds as to what effects we desire.

For my part, I consider that whatever is good or bad is embodied in individuals, not primarily in communities. Some philosophies which could be used to support the corporative State—notably the philosophy of Hegel—attribute ethical qualities to communities as such, so that a State may be admirable though most of its citizens are wretched. I think that such philosophies are tricks for justifying the privileges of the holders of power, and that, whatever our politics may be, there can be no valid argument for an undemocratic ethic. I mean by an undemocratic ethic one which singles out a certain portion of mankind and says "these men are to enjoy the good things, and the rest are merely to minister to them." I should reject such an ethic in any case, but it has . . . the disadvantage of being self-refuting, since it is very unlikely that, in practice, the supermen will be able to live the kind of life that the aristocratic theorist imagines for them.

Some objects of desire are such as can, logically, be enjoyed by all, while others must, by their very nature, be confined to a portion of the community. All might—with a little rational co-operation—be fairly well off, but it is impossible for all to enjoy the pleasure of being richer than their neighbours. All can enjoy a certain degree of self-direction,

but it is impossible for all to be dictators over others. Perhaps in time there will be a population in which everybody is fairly intelligent, but it is not possible for all to secure the rewards bestowed on exceptional intelligence. And so on.

Social co-operation is possible in regard to the good things that are capable of being universal—adequate material well-being, health, intelligence, and every form of happiness which does not consist in superiority to others. But the forms of happiness which consist of victory in a competition cannot be universal. The former kind of happiness is promoted by friendly feeling, the latter (and its correlative unhappiness) by unfriendly feeling. Unfriendly feeling can wholly inhibit the rational pursuit of happiness; it does so at present in what concerns the economic relations of nations. Given a population in which friendly feelings preponderate, there will be no clash between the interests of different individuals or different groups; the clashes which at present exist are caused by unfriendly feeling, which they in turn intensify. England and Scotland fought each other for centuries; at last, by an accident of inheritance they came to have the same king, and the wars ceased. Everybody was happier in consequence, even Dr. Johnson, whose jests doubtless afforded him more pleasure than he would have derived from victorious battles.

We can now arrive at certain conclusions on the subject of the ethics of power.

The ultimate aim of those who have power

(and we all have some) should be to promote social co-operation, not in one group as against another, but in the whole human race. The chief obstacle to this end at present is the existence of feelings of unfriendliness and desire for superiority. Such feelings can be diminished either directly by religion and morality or indirectly by removing the political and economic circumstances which at present stimulate them—notably the competition for power between States and the connected competition for wealth between large national industries. Both methods are needed: they are not alternatives, but supplement each other.

The Great War, and its aftermath of dictatorships, has caused many to underestimate all forms of power except military and governmental force. This is a short-sighted and unhistorical view. If I had to select four men who have had more power than any others. I should mention Buddha and Christ, Pythagoras and Galileo. No one of these four had the support of the State until after his propaganda had achieved a great measure of success. No one of the four had much success in his own lifetime. No one of the four would have affected human life as he has done if power had been his *primary* object. No one of the four sought the kind of power that enslaves others, but the kind that sets them free—in the case of the first two, by showing how to master the desires that lead to strife, and thence to defeat slavery and subjection; in the case of the second two, by pointing the way

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towards control of natural forces. It is not ultimately by violence that men are ruled, but by the wisdom of those who appeal to the common desires of mankind, for happiness, for inward and outward peace, and for the understanding of the world in which, by no choice of our own, we have to live.

THE GANDHIAN WAY

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

A world-renowned Indian philosopher of our day expounds here the creed of non-violence of the greatest man of our age. The way of violence and war has brought the world to a sorry pass; it is time it heeded the teachings of some of its wisest and saintliest men and turned to the path of truth and non-violence. In this age of the atomic and the hydrogen bomb the salvation of man, both physical and spiritual, depends on his renunciation of physical, in favour of spiritual, force.

Our passage forms the section, 'Satyāgraha', in the introduction by Dr. Radhakrishnan to *Mahatma Gandhi: Essays and Reflections on His Life and Work* (1939).

"*Ahimsā* or non-violence is the highest duty" is a well-known saying of the *Mahābhārata*. Its practical application in life is satyāgraha or soul-force. It is based on the assumption that "the world rests on the bedrock of *satya* or truth. *Asatya*, meaning untruth, also means non-existent, and *satya* or truth means 'that which is'. If untruth does not so much as exist, its victory is out of the question. And truth being 'that which is' can never be destroyed." God is the reality. The will to freedom and love is in accordance with reality. When a man rejects this will for his own interests, he is rejecting himself. By this act of frustration he is setting himself in opposition to reality, is isolating himself from it. The negation represents

man's estrangement from himself, his denial of the truth about himself. It cannot be final or ultimate. "The gates of hell shall not prevail". God cannot be beaten. The meek shall inherit the earth and not the mighty, who will lose themselves in the effort to save themselves, for they put their trust in unspiritual or unreal things like wealth and death-dealing weapons. Ultimately men are ruled not by those who believe in negation, hatred, violence, but by those who believe in wisdom and love, in inward and outward peace.

Satyāgraha is rooted in the power of reality, in the inward strength of the soul. It is not merely the negative virtue of abstaining from violence, but the positive one of doing good. "If I hit my adversary, that is of course violence; but to be truly non-violent, I must love him and pray for him even when he hits me." Love is unity and it comes in to clash with evil, which is separateness, getting, despising, hating, hurting and killing. Love does not acquiesce in evil, in wrongdoing, injustice or exploitation. It does not evade the issue but fearlessly faces the wrong-doer and resists his wrong with the overpowering force of love and suffering, for it is contrary to human nature to fight with force. Our conflicts are to be settled by the human means of intelligence, and good will, of love and service. In this confused world the one saving feature is the great adventure of being human. Creative life asserts itself in the midst of death. In spite of all this fear and gloom, humanity is practised by all,

by the farmer and the weaver, by the artist and the philosopher, by the monk in the cloister and the scientist in the laboratory, and by all, young and old, when they love and suffer. Life is immense. *Prāno virāt.*

The advocates of the use of force adopt a crude version of the Darwinian struggle for existence. They overlook the fundamental distinction between the animal and the human worlds and exalt a biological generalization into a doctrine of human destiny. If violent resistance is adopted in a world where it does not belong, human life is in danger of being degraded to the level of animal existence. In the *Mahābhārata* the warring world of men is compared to a dog kennel. "First there comes the wagging of tails, then the bark, then the replying bark, then the turning of the one round the other, then the show of teeth, then the roaring, and then comes the commencement of the fight. It is the same with men; there is no difference whatever." Gandhi asks us to leave fighting to apes and dogs and behave like men and serve the right by quiet suffering. Love or self-suffering can overcome the enemy, not by destroying him but by changing him, for he is, after all, a person of like passions with ourselves. Gandhi's acts of repentance and self-humiliation are full of moral courage and atoning sacrifice.

While a few individuals here and there tried to use the method of love in their personal lives, it is Gandhi's supreme achievement to have adopted

it as a plan for social and political liberation. Under his leadership organized groups in South Africa and India have used it on a large scale for the redress of grievances. Entirely abjuring the use of any physical violence for attaining political ends, he has developed this new technique in the history of political revolution, a technique which does not injure the spiritual tradition of India but arises out of it.

It has taken the different forms of passive resistance, non-violent non-cooperation, and civil disobedience. Every one of them is based on hatred of the wrong and love for the wrongdoer. A *satyāgrahi* is chivalrous to his opponents. The disobedience to law has always to be civil, and "civility does not mean the mere outward gentleness of speech cultivated for the occasion, but an inborn gentleness and a desire to do the opponent good." In all his campaigns, whenever the enemy was in trouble, Gandhi went to his rescue. He condemns all attempts to use the enemy's need as one's opportunity. We should not strike a bargain with Britain when she is in trouble in Europe. During the war he wrote to the Viceroy of India: "If I could make my countrymen retrace their steps, I would make them withdraw all the Congress resolutions and not whisper 'Home rule' or 'Responsible government' during the pendency of the war." Even General Smuts felt the irresistible appeal of Gandhi's methods, and one of his secretaries said to Gandhi: "I do not like your people and I do not

care to assist them at all. But what am I to do? You help us in our days of need. How can we lay hands upon you? I often wish that you took to violence like the English strikers and then we would know at once how to dispose of you. But you will not injure even the enemy. You desire victory by self-suffering alone and never transgress your self-imposed limits of courtesy and chivalry. And that is what reduces us to sheer helplessness."

Twenty years after the war to end war millions of men are again under arms and in peace time armies are mobilizing, fleets are covering the seas, and aeroplanes are assembling in the sky. We know that war solves no problems but only makes their solution more difficult. Many Christian men and women are tormented by the arguments for and against war. The pacifist declares that war is a crime that disgraces humanity and there is no justification for defending civilization by the instruments of barbarism. We have no right to impose suffering on men and women with whom we have no quarrel. A nation engaged in war is inspired by a grim determination to defeat and destroy the enemy. It is swept by fear and the passion of hatred. We cannot rain death and destruction on a crowded city in a spirit of love and forgiveness. The whole method of war is to engage Satan to reprove Satan. It is contrary to the mind of Jesus, his moral teaching and example. We cannot reconcile killing and Christianity.

The advocates of war argue that, though war

is a dreadful evil, on occasion it becomes the lesser of two evils. Practical wisdom consists in a proper appreciation of relative values. We owe obligations to the social community and the State which is its organ. As members of a society we derive protection of person and property, education and other advantages which give our lives value and interest. Naturally our duty is to defend the State when it is attacked, to preserve the inheritance when it is threatened.

It is this line of argument that is presented to us when we are called upon to maim and kill, to wound and destroy people against whom we have no ill will. Nazi Germany contends that man's principal duty is membership of his State, and his reality, goodness and true freedom the furtherance of its ends. The State has the right to subordinate the happiness of individuals to its own greatness. The great virtue is that it kills man's longing, in the weakness of his flesh, for personal liberty. In his speech at the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the Fascist party, Mussolini said: "The order of the day is more ships, more guns and more aeroplanes at whatever cost and by whatever means, even if we have to wipe out completely what is called civilian life." "From prehistoric days one cry has been borne over the centuries, 'Woe to the unarmed'." "We desire that nothing more shall be heard of brotherhood, sisterhood, cousinhood or their bastard parenthoods because the relations between States are relations of force and these rela-

tions of force are the determining elements of our policy." Mussolini adds, "If the problem is considered on the plane of morality, nobody has the right to throw the first stone." Empire building is like a game of cards. Some Powers get a good hand and play so well that others are nowhere. When all the profits are in the pocket they turn round and say that gambling is bad and assume an attitude of amazement that others wish to play the old game. It is not right to assume that the idols of race, power and armed force are worshipped only in Central Europe.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, in his speech in the House of Lords during the debate on the 20th of March, pleaded for "the massing of might on the side of the right." "We are driven to this," he argues, "because we are convinced that there are some things that are more sacred even than peace and that these things must be defended." "I cannot believe that it is against the will of providence that nations should defend things which are so precious to civilization and human welfare." In Gandhi we have that rarest kind of religious man who could face a fanatical, patriotic assembly and say that he would, if he had to, sacrifice even India to the Truth. Gandhi says: "Most religious men I have met are politicians in disguise: I, however, who wear the guise of a politician, am at heart a religious man."

The aim of the religious individual is not to degrade the vision to the demands of the actual but

to raise the actual to the pattern of the ideal. Our patriotic allegiances disrupt the spiritual unity of the human family and we maintain our loyalty to the larger community by refusing to engage in war, and our loyalty to our State by defending it in religious and human ways. The religious at least, like the Apostles, "ought to obey God rather than men." Our trouble is that society in all countries is in the hands of people who believe in war as an instrument of policy and think of progress in terms of conquest.

Man, unless he is sadistic, is happy when he is gentle and merciful. There is joy in creation and misery in destruction. The common soldiers have no hatred for their enemies, but the ruling classes by appealing to their fear, self-interest and pride seduce them from their humanity. People in whom rage and hatred are factitiously produced fight one another because they are simple men trained to obedience. Even then they cannot put rancour in their killing. It is discipline that compels them to do what they hate. The ultimate responsibility rests with the Governments that are implacable and pitiless. They have imprisoned simple people and diminished their humanity. Men who delight in creation are drilled to form armies, navies and air fleets that are meant for destruction. We applaud murder and make mercy a thing of shame. We forbid the teaching of truth and command the spreading of lies. We rob both our own people and strangers of decency, of

happiness and of life, and make ourselves responsible for mass murders and spiritual death.

We cannot have peace until all nations treat with each other in a mood of freedom and friendliness, until we develop a new conception of the integrated social life. The fate of civilization and humanity on this planet is bound up with that deep instinct for the universal values of spirit, freedom, justice and love of man which form the breath of Gandhi's being. In this violent and distracted world Gandhi's non-violence seems to be a dream too beautiful to be true. For him God is truth and love, and God wishes us to be truthful and loving regardless of consequences. A truly religious man takes as much trouble to discover what is right as the prudent man does to discover what will pay, and he does it even if it means the surrender of his deepest interests, individual, racial and national. Only those who have emptied themselves of all selfishness, individual and corporate, have the strength and the courage to say, "May my interests perish, so Thy will be done." Gandhi does not admit the possibility that the love of God and of truth and fair dealing can hurt anyone. He is certain that against the rock of moral law the world's conquerors and exploiters hurl themselves eventually to their own destruction. It is not even safe to be immoral, for the will to power is self-defeating. When we talk of "national welfare," we assume that we have an inviolate and perpetual right to hold certain territories; and as for "civilization", the world has

seen a number of civilizations on which the dust of ages has settled. The jungle has conquered their cities and jackals howl there in the moonlight.

Considerations of "civilization" and "national welfare" are irrelevant to the man of faith. Love is not a matter of policy or calculation. To those who are persuaded by despair that there is no remedy against the violence of the modern world but to escape or destroy, Gandhi says that there is another within the reach of us all, the principle of love which has upheld the spirit of man through many tyrannies and will uphold it still. His *satyāgraha* may seem an ineffectual answer to the gigantic displays of brute force; but there is something more formidable than force, the immortal spirit of man which will not be subdued by noise or numbers. It will break all fetters which tyrants seek to rivet on it. In an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent who asked him in the March crisis for a message to the world, Gandhi recommended simultaneous disarmament on the part of the democratic powers as the solution. "I am certain," he said, "as I am sitting here, that this would open Hitler's eyes and disarm him." The interviewer asked, "Would not that be a miracle?" Gandhi replied: "Perhaps. But it would save the world from the butchery which seems impending." "The hardest metal yields to sufficient heat; even so must the hardest heart melt before the sufficiency of the heat of non-violence. And there is no limit to the capacity of non-violence to generate heat. . . .

During my half-century of experience I have not come across a situation when I had to say that I was helpless, that I had no remedy in terms of non-violence." Love is the law of human life, its natural necessity. We are approaching a state when this necessity would be manifest, for human life would be impossible if men were to evade and disobey this principle. We have wars simply because we are not sufficiently selfless for a life which does not need wars. The battle for peace must be fought in the heart of the individual. The spirit in him must break the power of pride and selfishness, lust and fear. A new way of life must become the foundation of national life as well as of world order, a way of life which will conserve and foster the true interests of all classes, races and nations. It is the freed men, who have liberated themselves from submission to the blind, selfish will of *avidyā*, that can work for and establish peace. Peace is a positive demonstration in life and behaviour of certain universal principles and standards. We must fight for them with weapons which do not involve the debasement of moral values or the destruction of human life. In this effort we must be ready to endure whatever suffering comes our way.

In my travels in different parts of the world I have noted that Gandhi's reputation is more universal than that of the greatest statesmen and leaders of nations, and his personality more beloved and esteemed than any or all of them. His name is familiar to such a degree that there is scarcely a peasant or

factory worker who does not consider him to be a friend of human kind. They seem to think that he is likely to restore the golden age. But we cannot summon it, as we would summon, let us say, a passing cab. For we are subject to a thing more powerful than any nation, more humiliating than any conquest, and that is ignorance. Though all our faculties are designed for life, we have allowed them to be perverted in the cause of death. Though the right to happiness is clearly implicit in the creation of humankind, we have allowed that right to be neglected and suffered our energy to be used in the pursuit of power and wealth by which the happiness of the many is sacrificed to the doubtful satisfaction of a few. The world is in slavery to the same error to which you and I are subject. We must strive, not for wealth and power, but for the establishment of love and humanity. Freedom from error is the only true liberty.

Gandhi is the prophet of a liberated life wielding power over millions of human beings by virtue of his exceptional holiness and heroism. There will always be some who will find in such rare examples of sanctity the note of strength and stark reality which is missing in a life of general good will, conventional morality or vague aesthetic affectation, which is all that many modern teachers have to offer. To be true, to be simple, to be pure and gentle of heart, to remain cheerful and contented in sorrow and danger, to love life and not to fear death, to

serve the Spirit and not to be haunted by the spirits of the dead, nothing better has ever been taught or lived since the world first began.

CAUSES OF WAR

ALDOUS HUXLEY

Thinking for tomorrow is, in the context of our times, thinking largely of preventing another and more ruinous World War from breaking out. If we are to succeed in establishing a genuine and lasting peace, we should, obviously, first understand how wars are caused. In the following pages no less a thinker than the versatile and incisive Aldous Huxley analyses the causes of war. The analysis is part of the chapter on War in his very thoughtful book, *Ends and Means* (1937).

War exists because people wish it to exist. They wish it to exist for a variety of reasons.

(i) Many people like war because they find their peace-time occupations either positively humiliating and frustrating, or just negatively boring. In their studies on suicide Durkheim and, more recently, Halbwachs have shown that the suicide rate among non-combatants tends to fall during war-time to about two-thirds of its normal figure. This decline must be put down to the following causes: to the simplification of life during war-time (it is in complex and highly developed societies that the suicide rate is highest); to the intensification of nationalist sentiment to a point where most individuals are living in a state of chronic enthusiasm; to the fact that life during war-time takes on significance and purposefulness, so that even the most

intrinsically boring job is ennobled as 'war-work'; to the artificial prosperity induced, at any rate for a time, by the expansion of war industries; to the increased sexual freedom which is always claimed by societies, all or some of whose members live under the menace of sudden death. Add to this the fact that life in war-time is (or at least was in previous wars) extremely interesting, at least during the first years of the war. Rumour runs riot, and the papers are crammed every morning with the most thrilling news. . .

(ii) A principal cause of war is nationalism, and nationalism is immensely popular because it is psychologically satisfying to individual nationalists. Every nationalism is an idolatrous religion, in which the god is the personified state, represented in many instances by a more or less deified king or dictator. Membership of the *ex hypothesi* divine nation is thought of as imparting a kind of mystical pre-eminence. Thus, all 'God's Englishmen' are superior to 'the lesser breeds without the law,' and every individual God's-Englishman is entitled to think himself superior to every member of the lesser breed, even the lordliest and wealthiest, even the most intelligent, the most highly gifted, the most saintly. Any man who believes strongly enough in the local nationalistic idolatry can find in his faith an antidote against even the most acute inferiority complex. (Dictators feed the flames of national vanity and reap their reward in the gratitude of millions to whom the conviction that they

are participants in the glory of the divine nation brings relief from the gnawing consciousness of poverty, social unimportance and personal insignificance.)

Self-esteem has as its complement disparagement of others. Vanity and pride beget contempt and hatred. But contempt and hatred are exciting emotions—emotions from which people 'get a kick.' Devotees of one national idolatry enjoy getting the kick of hatred and contempt for devotees of other idolatries. They pay for that enjoyment by having to prepare for the wars which hatred and contempt render almost inevitable. Another point. In the normal course of events most men and women behave tolerably well. This means that they must frequently repress their anti-social impulses. They find a vicarious satisfaction for these impulses through films and stories about gangsters, pirates, swindlers, bad bold barons and the like. Now the personified nation, as I have pointed out already, is divine in size, strength and mystical superiority, but sub-human in moral character. (The ethics of international politics are precisely those of the gangster, the pirate, the swindler, the bad bold baron. The exemplary citizen can indulge in vicarious criminality, not only on the films, but also in the field of international relations.) The divine nation of whom he is mystically a part bullies and cheats, blusters and threatens in a way which many people find profoundly satisfying to their sedulously repressed lower natures. Submissive to the wife,

kind to the children, courteous to the neighbours, the soul of honesty in business, the good citizen feels a thrill of delight when his country 'takes a strong line,' 'enhances its prestige,' 'scores a diplomatic victory,' 'increases its territory'—in other words, when it bluffs, bullies, swindles and steals. The nation is a strange deity. It imposes difficult duties and demands the greatest sacrifices and, because it does this and because human beings have a hunger and thirst after righteousness, it is loved. But it is also loved because it panders to the lowest elements in human nature and because men and women like to have excuses to feel pride and hatred, because they long to taste even at second hand the joys of criminality.

So much for the psychological causes of war—or, to be more exact, the psychological background whose existence makes possible the waging of wars. We have now to consider the immediate causes of war. Ultimately, they also are psychological; but since they display special forms of human behaviour and since these special forms of behaviour manifest themselves in certain highly organized fields of activity, we prefer to call them 'political' and 'economic' causes. For the purposes of classification, this is convenient; but the convenience has its disadvantages. We are apt to think of 'politics' and 'economics' as impersonal forces outside the domain of psychology, working in some way on their own and apart from human beings. To the extent that human beings are habit-bound and condition-

ed by their social environment, politics and economics possess a certain limited autonomy; for wherever a social organization exists, individuals tend to submit themselves to the workings of its machinery. (But man is not made for the Sabbath, nor is he invariably willing to believe that he is made for the Sabbath. To some extent his will is free, and from time to time he remembers the fact and alters the organizational machinery around him to suit his needs.) When this happens the conception of politics and economics as autonomous forces, independent of human psychology, becomes completely misleading. It is convenient, I repeat, to class the economic and political causes of war under separate headings. But we must not forget that all such causes are ultimately psychological in their nature.

(iii) The first of the political causes of war is war itself. Many wars have been fought, among other reasons, for the sake of seizing some strategically valuable piece of territory, or in order to secure a 'natural' frontier—that is to say, a frontier which it is easy to defend and from which it is easy to launch attacks upon one's neighbours. Purely military advantages are almost as highly prized by the rulers of nations as economic advantages. The possession of an army, navy and air force is in itself a reason for going to war. We must use our forces now,' so runs the militarist's argument, 'in order that we may be in a position to use them to better effect next time.'

The part played by armaments in causing war may properly be considered under this heading. All statesmen insist that the armaments of their own country are solely for purposes of defence. At the same time, all statesmen insist that the existence of armaments in a foreign country constitutes a reason for the creation of new armaments at home. Every nation is perpetually taking more and more elaborate defensive measures against the more and more elaborate defensive measures of all other nations. The armament race would go on *ad infinitum*, if it did not inevitably and invariably lead to war. Armaments lead to war for two reasons. The first is psychological. The existence of armaments in one country creates fear, suspicion, resentment and hatred in neighbouring countries. In such an atmosphere, any dispute easily becomes envenomed to the point of being made a *casus belli*. The second is technical in character. Armaments become obsolete, and today the rate of obsolescence is rapid and accelerating. At the present rate of technological progress an aeroplane is likely to be out of date within a couple of years, or less. This means that, for any given country, there is likely to be an optimum moment of preparedness, a moment when its equipment is definitely superior to that of other nations. Within a very short time this superiority will disappear and the nation will be faced with the task of scrapping its now obsolescent equipment and building new equipment equal to, or if possible better than, the new equipment

of its neighbours. The financial strain of such a process is one which only the richest countries can stand for long. For poorer nations it is unendurable. Hence there will always be a strong temptation for the rulers of the poor countries to declare war during the brief period when their own military equipment is superior to that of their rivals.

The fact that armaments are to a great extent manufactured by private firms and that these private firms have a financial interest in selling weapons of war to their own and foreign governments is also a contributory cause of war. This matter will be dealt with in a later section.

(iv) Wars may be made for the purpose of furthering a religious or political creed. The Mohammedan invasions, the Crusades, the Wars of Religion during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the French Revolutionary Wars, the American Civil War, the Spanish Civil War are all examples of what may be called ideological wars. True, the makers of ideological wars were to some extent influenced by non-ideological considerations—by greed for wealth and dominion, by desire for glory, and the like. But in all cases the ideological motive was paramount. Unless there had been a desire to propagate a new creed or defend an old, these wars would not have been fought. Moreover, the fighting would not have been so bitter as in fact it generally was, if the fighters had not been inspired by religious or pseudo-religious faith. The aim of modern nationalistic propaganda is to trans-

form men's normal affection for their home into a fiercely exclusive worship of the deified nation. Disputes between nations are beginning to take on that uncompromising, fanatical quality which, in the past, characterized the dealings between groups of religious or political sectaries. It looks as though all future wars will be as ferociously ideological as the old wars of religion.

(v) In the past, many wars were fought for the sake of the 'glory' resulting from victory. The glory was generally thought of as belonging to the leader of the army, or the king his master. The Assyrian monarchs fought for glory; so did Alexander the Great; so did many mediaeval kings and lords; so did Louis XIV and the dynasts of eighteenth-century Europe; so did Napoleon; so perhaps will the modern dictators. Where countries are ruled by a single individual at the head of a military oligarchy, there is always a danger that personal vanity and the thirst for glory may act as motives driving him to embroil his country in war.

(vi) Glory is generally regarded as the perquisite of the general or king; but not always or exclusively. In a country whose people are moved by strong nationalistic feelings, glory can be thought of as pertaining in some degree to every member of the community. All Englishmen shared in the glory of their Tudor monarchs; all Frenchmen in that of Louis XIV. During the French Revolution, a deliberate attempt was made to popularize glory by means of written and spoken propaganda. The

attempt was fully successful. Similar attempts are being made all over the world to-day. The press, the radio and the film bring national glory within the reach of all. When things go badly at home and his people start to complain, the dictator is always tempted to manufacture a little compensatory glory abroad. Glory was a good deal cheaper in the past than it is to-day. Moreover, the dictatorial war lord of earlier times did not have to consider public opinion to the same extent that even the most absolute of his modern counterparts must do. The reason is simple. In the past the glory-making machine was a small professional army. So long as the battles were being fought at a reasonable distance from their homes, people did not feel much concern about this professional army; its sufferings did not affect them personally, and when it won a victory, they got the glory vicariously and free of charge. To-day every man must serve as a conscript, and the aeroplane has made war almost as dangerous for non-combatants as for front-line fighters. Glory must be paid for by all; war is now the affair of every man, woman and child in the community. The cost of modern war in life and money is so enormous and must be so widely distributed, its possible effects on public opinion and the structure of society so incalculable, that even dictators hesitate to make their people fight except where 'national honour' and 'vital interests' are concerned. Twentieth-century armaments are an insurance against small and trivial wars. On

the other hand, they are an absolute guarantee that when 'vital interests' and 'national honour' are at stake, the resulting war shall be unprecedentedly destructive.

(vii) Of the economic causes of war the first in historical importance is the desire of one nation to possess itself of fertile territory belonging to another nation. Hitler, for example, has stated that the Germans need new territory in which to accommodate their surplus population. If Germany goes to war with Russia it will be, in part at least, to satisfy this real or imaginary craving for more and better land.

In modern times wars have been fought not so much for fertile lands as for the possession or control of raw materials indispensable to industry. The iron ore of Lorraine has been a bone of contention between France and Germany. Japan's activities in Manchuria and Northern China can be explained, at least in part, by need for minerals. Italian and German participation in the Spanish Civil War has not been exclusively motivated by ideological considerations. The two Fascist dictators have their eyes on the copper of Rio Tinto, the iron of Bilbao, which before the outbreak of war were under English control.

(viii) Under capitalism all highly industrialized countries need foreign markets. The reason for this is that, where production is carried on for profit, it is difficult or impossible to distribute enough purchasing power to enable people to buy

the things they themselves have produced. Defects in domestic purchasing power have to be made up by finding foreign markets. The imperialistic activities of the great powers during the nineteenth century were directed in large measure towards securing markets for their productions. But—and this is one of the strangest paradoxes of the capitalist system—no sooner has a market been secured, either by conquest or peaceful penetration, than the very industrialists who manufacture for that market proceed to equip the conquered or peacefully penetrated country with the machinery that will enable it to dispense with their goods. Most of the industrially backward countries have been equipped to provide for themselves, and even to export a surplus, by those very capitalists who originally used them as markets for their own productions. Such a policy seems and, on a long view, actually is completely lunatic. On a short view, however, it is sensible enough. Capitalists are concerned not only to sell their production, but also to invest their savings. Savings invested in industrial concerns newly established in backward countries, where the standard of living is low and labour can be sweated, generally bring enormous returns, at any rate during the first years. For the sake of these huge temporary profits capitalists are prepared to sacrifice the smaller but more lasting profits to be derived from using these same backward countries as markets for their productions. In course of time the profits of oversea investment

diminish, and meanwhile the markets have been lost for ever. But in the interval capitalists have earned a hung return on their investments.

(ix) This brings us to an extremely important cause of war—the pursuit by politically powerful minorities within each nation of their own private interests. The worst, or at any rate the most conspicuous, offenders in this respect are the manufacturers of armaments. It is unnecessary for me to cite facts and figures; they are available in a number of well-documented, easily accessible books and pamphlets. It is enough to state the following simple generalizations. War and the preparation for war are profitable to the arms manufacturer. The more heavily the nations arm, the greater his profits. This being so, he is tempted to foment war scares, to pit government against government, to use every means in his power, from bribery to 'patriotic' propaganda, in order to stultify all efforts at disarmament. The historical records show that the manufacturers of armaments have only too frequently succumbed to these temptations.

One of the measures common to the programmes of all the world's left-wing parties is the nationalization of the arms industry. To a certain extent all states are already in the armaments business. In England, for example, the government arsenals produce about five-twelfths of the nation's arms, private firms about seven-twelfths. Complete nationalization would thus be merely the wider application of a well-established principle.

Now the complete nationalization of the arms industry would certainly achieve one good result: it would liberate governments from the influence of socially irresponsible capitalists, interested solely in making large profits. So far, so good. But the trouble is that this particular reform does not go far enough—goes, in fact, hardly anywhere at all. Armaments are armaments, whoever manufactures them. A plane from a government factory can kill as many women and children as a plane from a factory owned by a private capitalist. Furthermore, the fact that armaments were being manufactured by the state would serve in some measure to legalize and justify an intrinsically abominable practice. The mass of unthinking public opinion would come to feel that an officially sanctioned arms industry was somehow respectable. Consequently the total abolition of the whole evil business would become even more difficult than it is at present. This difficulty would be enhanced by the fact that a central executive having complete control of the arms industry would be very reluctant to part with such an effective instrument of tyranny. For an instrument of tyranny is precisely what a nationalized armaments industry potentially is. The state is more powerful than any private employer, and the personnel of a completely nationalized arms industry could easily be dragooned and bribed into becoming a kind of technical army under the control of the executive.

Finally, we must consider the effect of national-

ization upon international affairs. Under the present dispensation adventurers like the late Sir Basil Zaharoff are free (within the limits imposed by the licensing system) to travel about, fanning the flames of international discord and peddling big guns and submarines. This is a state of things which should certainly be changed. But the state of things under a regime of nationalization is only a little better. Once in business, even governments like to make a profit; and the arms business will not cease to be profitable because it has been nationalized. Then, as now, industrially backward states will have to buy arms from the highly industrialized countries. All highly industrialized states will desire to sell armaments, not only for the sake of profits, but also in order to exercise control over the policy of their customers. Inevitably, this will result in the growth of intense rivalry between the industrialized powers—yet another rivalry, yet another potential cause of international discord and war. It would seem, then, that the nationalization of the armaments industry is merely the substitution of one evil for another. The new evil will be less manifest, less morally shocking than the old; but it is by no means certain that, so far as war is concerned, the results of nationalization will be perceptibly better than the results of private manufacture. What is needed is not the nationalization of the arms industry, but its complete abolition. Abolition will come when the majority wish it to come.

The manufacturers of armaments are not the only 'merchants of death.' To some extent, indeed, we all deserve that name. For in so far as we vote for governments that impose tariffs and quotas, in so far as we support policies of re-armament, in so far as we consent to our country's practice of economic, political and military imperialism, in so far even as we behave badly in private life, we are all doing our bit to bring the next war nearer. The responsibility of the rich and the powerful, however, is greater than that of ordinary men; for they are better paid for what they do to bring war closer and they know more clearly what they are about. Less spectacularly mischievous than the armament makers, but in reality hardly less harmful, are the speculative investors who preach imperialism because they can derive such high returns on their capital in backward countries. To the nation as a whole its colonies may be unprofitable, and actually costly. But to the politically powerful minority of financiers with capital to invest, of industrialists with surplus goods to dispose of, these same colonies may be sources of handsome profits.

The small, but politically powerful, minority of financiers and industrialists is also interested in various forms of economic imperialism. By a judicious use of their resources, the capitalists of highly industrialized nations stake out claims for themselves within nominally independent countries. Those claims are then represented as being the claims of their respective nations, and the quarrels,

between the various financial interests concerned become quarrels between states. The peace of the world has frequently been endangered, in order that oil magnates might grow a little richer.

In the press, which is owned by rich men, the interests of the investing minority are always identified (doubtless in perfectly good faith) with those of the nation as a whole. Constantly repeated statements come to be accepted as truths. Innocent and ignorant, most newspaper readers are convinced that the private interests of the rich are really public interests and become indignant whenever these interests are menaced by a foreign power, intervening on behalf of its investing minority. The interests at stake are the interests of the few; but the public opinion which demands the protection of these interests is often a genuine expression of mass emotion. The many really feel and believe that the dividends of the few are worth fighting for.)

nationalism has widened the area of political
loyalty of man

NATIONALISM AND ITS FRUITS

JOHN DEWEY

How far is nationalism justifiable in this twentieth century? How dangerous is it in an interdependent world? Nobody who wishes to see the nations of today and tomorrow live in peace and fellowship with one another can ignore these questions. John Dewey, distinguished American philosopher and educationist, gives us his answers in this essay taken from the collection called *Characters and Events* (1929).

Like most things in this world which are effective, even for evil, Nationalism is a tangled mixture of good and bad. And it is not possible to diagnose its undesirable results, much less to consider ways of counteracting them, unless the desirable traits are fully acknowledged. For they furnish the ammunition and the armour which are utilized as means of offence and defence by sinister interests to make Nationalism a power for evil.

Its beneficent qualities are connected with its historical origin. Nationalism was at least a movement away from obnoxious conditions—parochialism on one hand and dynastic despotism on the other. To be interested in a nation is at least better than to restrict one's horizon to the bounds of a parish and province. Historically, Nationalism is also connected with the decay of personal absolutism and dynastic rule. Loyalty to a nation

narrow
vision

is surely an advance over loyalty to a hereditary family endued in common belief with divine sanctions and covered with sacrosanct robes. Much of the superstitious awe and foolish sentiment has indeed passed over into Nationalism, but nevertheless the people of a country as a whole are surely a better object of devotion than a ruling family. Except where national spirit has grown up, public spirit is practically non-existent. In addition to these two historical changes, Nationalism is associated with the revolt of oppressed people against external imperial domination. If one wants to see one of the most potent motive forces in creating Nationalism, one has only to consider the Greece of fifty years ago, the Ireland of yesterday and the China and India of today.

It is not to the present purpose to consider these gains; but it is to the point that without them Nationalism could not be perverted to base ends. The passionate loyalties which have been produced by struggle for liberation from foreign yokes, by the sense of unity with others over a stretch of territory wider than the parish and village, by some degree of participation in the government of one's own country, furnish the material which, upon occasion, makes the spirit of a nation aggressive, suspicious, envious, fearful, acutely antagonistic. If a nation did not mean something positively valuable to the mass of its citizens, Nationalism could not be exploited in the interest of economic imperialism and of war, latent and overt. Carlton Hayes

has convincingly pointed out that Nationalism has become the religion of multitudes, perhaps the most influential religion of the present epoch. (This emotion of supreme loyalty to which other loyalties are unhesitatingly sacrificed in a crisis could hardly have grown to its high pitch of ardour unless men thought they had found in it the blessings for which they have always resorted to religious faith : protection of what is deemed of high value, defence against what menaces this value; in short an ever-present refuge in time of trouble.)

But institutionalized religion is something more than a personal emotion. To say it is institutionalized is to say that it involves a tough body of customs, ingrained habits of action, organized and authorized standards and methods of procedure. The habits that form institutions are so basal that for the most part they lie far below conscious recognition. But they are always ready to shape conduct, and when they are disturbed a violent emotional eruption ensues. Practices, after they are adopted, have to be accounted for and explained to be reasonable and desirable; they have to be justified. Hence, along with the emotions and habits, there develops a creed, a system of ideas, a theology in order to "rationalize" the activities in which men are engaged. Faith in these ideas, or at least in the catchwords which express them, becomes obligatory, necessary for social salvation; disbelief or indifference is heresy. Thus Nationalism starting as an unquestioned emotional loyalty, so supreme

as to be religious in quality, has invaded the whole of life. It denotes organized behaviour and a whole system of justificatory beliefs and notions appealed to in order to defend every act labelled "national" from criticism or inquiry. By constant reiteration, by shaming heretics and intimidating dissidents, by glowing admiration if not adoration of the faithful, by all agencies of education and propaganda (now, alas, so hard to distinguish) the phrases in which these defences and appeals are couched become substitutes for thought. They are axiomatic; only a traitor or an evilly disposed man doubts them. In the end, these rationalizations signify a complete abdication of reason. Bias, prejudice, blind and routine habit reign supreme. But they reign under the guise of idealistic standards and noble sentiments.

Any one who reads the laudations of patriotism which issue from one source and the disparagements which proceed from another group must have been struck by the way in which the same word can cover meanings as far apart as the poles. The word is used to signify public spirit as opposed to narrow selfish interests. When so employed patriotism is a synonym for intense loyalty to the good of the community of which one is a member; for willingness to sacrifice, even to the uttermost, in its behalf. So taken, it surely deserves all the eulogies and reverence bestowed upon it. But because of nationalistic religion and its rationalization, the test and mark of public spirit becomes intolerant disregard of all

other nations. Patriotism degenerates into a hateful conviction of intrinsic superiority. Another nation by the mere fact that it is other is suspect; it is a potential if not an actual foe. I doubt whether there is one person in a hundred who does not associate a large measure of exclusiveness with patriotism; and all exclusiveness is latent contempt for everything beyond its range. The rabies that exultantly sent Sacco and Venzetti to death is proof of how deeply such patriotism may canker. It extends not only to foreign nations as such, but to foreigners in our own country who manifest anything but the most uncritical "loyalty" to our institutions. Thousands upon thousands of the most respectable element in the community believed they were exhibiting patriotism to the nation or to Massachusetts when they urged the death of men who were guilty of the double crime of being aliens and contemnners of our form of government.

Were it not for facts in evidence it would be hard to conceive that any sane man would parade the motto: "My country right or wrong." But, alas, one cannot doubt that the slogan conveyed the feeling which generally attaches to patriotism. That public spirit, an active interest in whatever promotes the good of one's country, is debased and prostituted to such a use, is chargeable to Nationalism; and this fact stands first in its indictment.

It is a trait of unreasoning emotion to take things in a mass and thereby to create unities which have no existence outside of passion. Men who

pride themselves upon being "practical" and "concrete" would be incensed beyond measure if they were told that the nation to which they yield such unquestioning loyalty is an abstraction, a fiction. I do not mean by this statement that there is no such thing as a nation. In the sense of an enduring historic continuity of traditions and outlook in which the members of a given territory share, it is a reality. But the nation by which millions swear and for which they demand the sacrifice of all other loyalties is a myth; it has no being outside of emotion and fantasy. The notion of National Honour and the role which it plays is a sign of what is meant. Individual persons may feel insulted and may feel their honour to be at stake. (But the erection of a national territorial State into a Person who has a touchy and testy Honour to be defended and avenged at the cost of death and destruction is as sheer a case of animism as is found in the records of any savage tribe.) Yet he would be a thoughtless optimist who is sure that the United States will not some time wage a war to protect its National Honour.

As things now stand and as they are likely to remain there is really such a thing as national interest. It is to the interest of a nation that its citizens be protected from pestilence; that they be protected from crime, from external invasion, etc. But Nationalism has created a purely fictitious notion of national interests. If a large gold field were located just over the border of Alaska, thousands of American breasts would swell with pride, as thousands

would be depressed if it happened to lie in British territory. They would feel as if somehow they were personal gainers, as if the Nation to which they belong had somehow integrally promoted its interests. The illustration is somewhat trivial. But the spirit which it indicates is responsible for the acquiescence, if not the approval, with which the new Coolidge version of international law with respect to property rights of American citizens in foreign countries has been received. For the gist of his revolutionary edition of international law (if he says what he means and knows what he means) is that any property right or property interest of any private citizen or any corporation in a foreign country (doubtless with the tacit understanding that it is not one of the Great Powers) is a National Interest to be protected when necessary by national force.

The culmination of Nationalism is the doctrine of national sovereignty. Sovereignty was originally strictly personal or at least dynastic. A monarch held supreme power; the country was his proper domain or property. (The doctrine is historically explicable as part of the transition out of feudalism and the weakening of the power of feudal nobles in the growth of a centralized kingdom.) The doctrine was also bound up with the struggle of State against Church and the assertion of the political independence of the secular ruler from the authority of ecclesiastics. As historians have clearly shown, the doctrine of the divine right of kings originally meant that the secular monarchs had at least the

same kind of divine commission as had Pope or Archbishop. But with the rise of modern territorial states the idea and attributes of Sovereignty passed over from the ruler to the politically organized aggregate called the Nation.

In so doing, it retained all the evils that inhered in the notion of absolute and irresponsible personal power (or power responsible only to God and not to any earthly power or tribunal) and took on new potencies for harm. For disguise it as one may, the doctrine of national sovereignty is simply the denial on the part of a political state of either legal or moral responsibility. It is a direct proclamation of the unlimited and unquestionable right of a political state to do what it wants to do in respect to other nations and to do it as and when it pleases. It is a doctrine of international anarchy; and as a rule those who are most energetic in condemning anarchy as a domestic and internal principle are foremost in asserting anarchic irresponsibility in relations between nations. Internationalism is a word to which they attach accursed significance, an idea to which by all the great means at their disposal they attach a sinister and baleful significance, ignoring the fact that it but portends that subjection of relations between nations to responsible law which is taken for granted in relations between citizens. The doctrine is not of course carried to its logical extreme in ordinary times; it is mitigated by all sorts of concessions and compromises. But resort to war as the final arbiter of

serious disputes between nations, and the glorification of War through identification with patriotism is proof that irresponsible sovereignty is still the basic notion. Hence I spoke in terms of the popular fallacy when I referred to the "right" of a state to do as it pleases when it pleases. For *right* is here only a polite way of saying power. It was easy during the World War to accuse Germany of acting upon the notion that Might makes Right. But every state that cultivates and acts upon the notion of National Sovereignty is guilty of the same crime. And the case is not improved by the fact that the judges of what National Sovereignty requires are not actually the citizens who compose a nation but a group of diplomats and politicians.

Patriotism, National Honour, National Interests and National Sovereignty are the four foundation stones upon which the structure of the National State is erected. (It is no wonder that the windows of such a building are closed to the light of heaven; that its inmates are fear, jealousy, suspicion, and that War issues regularly from its portals.)

THE NEXT STAGE OF HISTORY

H. G. WELLS

We stand at another of the great cross-roads of history; either we take the wrong turn here and destroy ourselves with a third and last World War, or we surrender our national sovereignties and live harmoniously under a world-government. This, at least, is the view of many a thinking person today, and in the following passage the great visionary and social philosopher, H. G. Wells, paints an attractive picture of the benefits that would accrue to mankind from the setting up of a World State. What is reproduced is the concluding sections of his *Outline of History*, first published in 1920.

There can be little question that the attainment of a federation of all humanity, together with a sufficient measure of social justice, to ensure health, education, and a rough equality of opportunity to most of the children born into the world, would mean such a release and increase of human energy as to open a new phase in human history. The enormous waste caused by military preparation and the mutual annoyance of competing great powers and the still more enormous waste due to the under-productiveness of great masses of people, either because they are too wealthy for stimulus or too poor for efficiency, would cease. There would be a vast increase in the supply of human necessities, a rise in the standard of life and in what is considered a necessity, a development of transport and every kind of convenience; and a multitude of

people would be transferred from low-grade production to such higher work as art of all kinds, teaching, scientific research, and the like. All over the world there would be a setting free of human capacity, such as has occurred hitherto only in small places and through precious limited phases of prosperity and security. Unless we are to suppose that spontaneous outbreaks of super-men have occurred in the past, it is reasonable to conclude that the Athens of Pericles, the Florence of the Medici, Elizabethan England, the great deeds of Asoka, the Tang and Ming periods in art, are but samples of what a whole world of sustained security would yield continuously and cumulatively. Without supposing any change in human quality, but merely its release from the present system of inordinate waste, history justifies this expectation.

We have seen how, since the liberation of human thought in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a comparatively few curious and intelligent men, chiefly in western Europe, have produced a vision of the world and a body of science that is now, on the material side, revolutionizing life. Mostly these men have worked against great discouragement, with insufficient funds and small help or support from the mass of mankind. (It is impossible to believe that these men were the maximum intellectual harvest of their generation.) England alone in the last three centuries must have produced scores of Newtons who never learnt to read, hundreds of Daltons, Darwins, Bacons and Huxleys who

died stunted in hovels, or never got a chance of proving their quality. All the world over, there must have been myriads of potential first-class investigators, splendid artists, creative minds, who never caught a gleam of inspiration or opportunity, for every one of that kind who has left his mark upon the world. In the trenches of the Western front alone during the late war thousands of potential great men died unfulfilled. But a world with something like a secure international peace and something like social justice, will fish for capacity with the fine net of universal education, and may expect a yield beyond comparison greater than any yield of able and brilliant men that the world has known hitherto.

It is such considerations as this indeed which justify the concentration of effort in the near future upon the making of a new world state of righteousness out of our present confusions. War is a horrible thing, and constantly more horrible and dreadful, so that unless it is ended it will certainly end human society; social injustice, and the sight of the limited and cramped human beings it produces, torment the soul; but the strongest incentive to constructive political and social work for an imaginative spirit lies not so much in the mere hope of escaping evils as in the opportunity for great adventures that their suppression will open to our race. We want to get rid of the militarist not simply because he hurts and kills, but because he is an intolerable thick-voiced blockhead who stands

hectoring and blustering in our way to achievement. We want to abolish many extravagances of private ownership just as we should want to abolish some idiot guardian who refused us admission to a studio in which there were fine things to do.

There are people who seem to imagine that a world order and one universal law of justice would end human adventure. It would but begin it. But instead of the adventure of the past, the "romance" of the cinematograph world, the perpetual reiterated harping upon the trite reactions of sex and combat and the hunt for gold, it would be an unending exploration upon the edge of experience. Hitherto man has been living in a slum, amidst quarrels, revenges, vanities, shames and taints, hot desires and urgent appetites. He has scarcely tasted sweet air yet and the great freedoms of the world that science has enlarged for him.

To picture to ourselves something of the wider life that world unity would open to men is a very attractive speculation. Life will certainly go with a stronger pulse, it will breathe a deeper breath, because it will have dispelled and conquered a hundred infections of body and mind that now reduce it to invalidism and squalor. We have already laid stress on the vast elimination of drudgery from human life through the creation of a new race of slaves, the machines. This—and the disappearance of war and the smoothing out of endless restraints and contentions by juster social and economic arrangements—will lift the burthen of

toilsome work and routine work, that has been the price of human security since the dawn of the first civilizations, from the shoulders of our children. Which does not mean that they will cease to work, but that they will cease to do irksome work under pressure, and will work freely, planning, making, creating, according to their gifts and instincts. They will fight nature no longer as dull conscripts of the pick and plough, but for a splendid conquest. Only the spiritlessness of our present depression blinds us to the clear intimations of our reason that in the course of a few generations every little country town could become an Athens, every human being could be gentle in breeding and healthy in body and mind, the whole solid earth man's mine and its uttermost regions his playground.

There will be little drudgery in this better-ordered world. Natural power harnessed in machines will be the general drudge. What drudgery is inevitable will be done as a service and duty for a few years or months out of each life; it will not consume nor degrade the whole life of anyone. And not only drudges, but many other sorts of men and ways of living which loom large in the current social scheme will necessarily have dwindled in importance or passed away altogether. There will be few professional fighting men or none at all, no custom-house officers; the increased multitude of teachers will have abolished large police forces and large jail staffs, mad-houses will be rare or non-existent; a world-wide sanitation will have

diminished the proportion of hospitals, nurses, sick-room attendants, and the like; a world-wide economic justice, the floating population of cheats, sharpers, gamblers, forestallers, parasites, and speculators generally. But there will be no diminution of adventure or romance in this world of the days to come. Sea fisheries and the incessant insurrection of the sea, for example, will call for their own stalwart types of men; the high air will clamour for manhood, the deep and dangerous secret places of nature. Men will turn again with renewed interest to the animal world. In these disordered days a stupid, uncontrollable massacre of animal species goes on—from certain angles of vision it is a thing almost more tragic than human miseries; in the nineteenth century dozens of animal species were exterminated; but one of the first fruits of an effective world state would be the better protection of what are now wild beasts. It is a strange thing in human history to note how little has been done since the Bronze Age in taming, using, befriending, and appreciating the animal life about us. But that mere witless killing which is called sport today would inevitably give place in a better-educated world community to a modification of the primitive instincts that find expression in this way, changing them into an interest not in the deaths, but in the lives of beasts, and leading to fresh and perhaps very strange and beautiful attempts to befriend these pathetic, kindred lower creatures we no longer fear as enemies, hate as rivals,

or need as slaves. And a world state and universal justice does not mean the imprisonment of our race in any bleak institutional orderliness. There will still be mountains and the sea, there will be jungles and great forests, cared for indeed and treasured and protected; the great plains will still spread before us and the wild winds blow. But men will not hate so much, fear so much, nor cheat so desperately—and they will keep their minds and bodies cleaner.

There are unhopeful prophets who see in the gathering together of men into one community the possibility of violent race conflicts, conflicts for "ascendancy", but that is to suppose that civilization is incapable of adjustments by which men of different qualities and temperaments and appearances will live side by side, following different roles and contributing diverse gifts. The weaving of mankind into one community does not imply the creation of a homogeneous community, but rather the reverse: the welcome and the adequate utilization of distinctive quality in an atmosphere of understanding. It is the almost universal bad manners of the present age which make race intolerable to race. (The community to which we may be moving will be more mixed—which does not necessarily mean more interbred—more various and more interesting than any existing community.) Communities all to one pattern, like boxes of toy soldiers, are things of the past rather than the future.

But one of the hardest, most impossible tasks

a writer can set himself, is to picture the life of people better educated, happier in their circumstances, more free and more healthy than he is himself. We know enough today to know that there is infinite room for betterment in every human concern. Nothing is needed but collective effort. Our poverty, our restraints, our infections, and indigestions, our quarrels and misunderstandings, are all things controllable and removable by concerted human action, but we know as little how life would feel without them as some poor dirty ill-treated, fierce-souled creature born and bred amidst the cruel and dingy surroundings of a European back-street can know what it is to bathe every day, always to be clad beautifully, to climb mountains for pleasure, to fly, to meet none but agreeable, well-mannered people, to conduct researches or make delightful things. Yet a time when all such good things will be for all men may be coming more nearly than we think. Each one who believes that brings the good time nearer; each heart that fails delays it.

One cannot foretell the surprises or disappointments the future has in store. Before this chapter of the World State can begin fairly in our histories, other chapters as yet unsuspected may still need to be written, as long and as full of conflict as our account of the growth and rivalries of the Great Powers. There may be tragic economic struggles, grim grapplings of race with race and class with class. It may be that "private enterprise"

will refuse to learn the lesson of service without some quite catastrophic revolution. We do not know; we cannot tell. These are unnecessary disasters, but they may be unavoidable disasters. Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe. Against the unifying effort of Christendom and against the unifying influence of the mechanical revolution, catastrophe won—at least to the extent of achieving the Great War. We cannot tell yet how much of the winnings of catastrophe still remain to be gathered in. New falsities may arise and hold men in some unrighteous and fated scheme of order for a time, before they collapse amidst the misery and slaughter of generations.

(Yet, clumsily or smoothly, the world, it seems, progresses and will progress . . .).

History is and must always be no more than an account of beginnings. We can venture to prophesy that the next chapters to be written will tell, though perhaps with long interludes of setback and disaster, of the final achievement of world-wide political and social unity. But when that is attained it will mean no resting stage, nor even a breathing stage, before the development of a new struggle and of new and vaster efforts. Men will unify only to intensify the search for knowledge and power, and live as ever for new occasions. Animal and vegetable life, the obscure processes of psychology, the intimate structure of matter and the interior of our earth, will yield their secrets and endow

their conqueror. Life begins perpetually. Gathered together at last under the leadership of man, the student-teacher of the universe, unified, disciplined, armed with the secret powers of the atom and with knowledge as yet beyond dreaming, Life, for ever dying to be born afresh, for ever young and eager, will presently stand upon this earth as upon a foot-stool, and stretch out its realm amidst the stars.

NOTES

RIGHT AND WRONG

Herbert Louis Samuel, First Viscount Samuel, was born in 1870. A Liberal in politics, he was a leader of the Liberal Party for a number of years and held high ministerial and administrative office from time to time. He became President of the British Institute of Philosophy in 1931. Among his publications are *Philosophy and the Ordinary Man*, *The Tree of Good and Evil*, *Practical Ethics*, and *Belief and Action*, from which our passage is taken.

PAGE 1

Platonists, Neo-Platonists, Kantians, Hegelians: The Neo-Platonists combined Platonic idealism with oriental mysticism, the system being founded by Plotinus of Alexandria (204-270 A.D.). The others mentioned are the followers respectively of Plato, the disciple of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle, and author of *The Republic* (died 347 B.C.); of Immanuel Kant, German philosopher and author of *Critique of Pure Reason* (1724-1804); and of Georg Wilhelm Hegel, German metaphysician, on whose doctrine of dialectic progression from thesis and antithesis to synthesis Marxism is based (1770-1831).

PAGE 2

American Declaration of Independence: On the 4th July, 1776, the American Congress declared the thirteen American colonies independent of Great Britain. The document was practically written in its entirety by Thomas Jefferson, who later became the Third President of the United States.

the French National Assembly: This came into being during the French Revolution. When in 1789 the clergy and the nobles refused to sit in the same chamber with the commons, the deputies of the people constituted themselves into a deliberative body under the name of the National Assembly. The National Assembly today is the supreme legislative body of France and consists of two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

PAGE 3

In many parts of Europe . . . dictators: The reference is to Hitler and Mussolini, the book having been written in 1937, when they were at the height of their power.

the principle of Evolution: propounded by Charles Darwin (1809-82) in his *Origin of Species* (1859) and *The Descent of Man* (1871). The different forms of animal and vegetable life, according to the theory, have resulted from small variations brought about mainly by natural selection; a constant struggle for existence leads to the selection of those qualities that are most useful for the continuance of a species.

PAGE 4

Huxley: Thomas Huxley (1825-95), scientific philosopher and champion of Darwin's Theory of Evolution. He was involved in several controversies relating to the function of science. He was the grandfather of Aldous Huxley, who is represented in this book.

Bergson: Henri Bergson (1859-1941), French philosopher who influenced European thought widely just before World War I. His most famous book was translated into English in 1911 as *Creative Evolution*.

PAGE 5

Laws of Manu: Hindu law-book giving the story of creation, attributed to Vaivasvata, the progenitor of mankind.

PAGE 6

a priori *a posteriori*: An 'a priori' argument (Latin 'from an antecedent') deduces effects from causes, while an 'a posteriori' argument (Latin 'from the latter') infers causes from effects. Thus, mathematical reasoning is 'a priori,' and legal 'a posteriori.'

goods: desirable objects, ends worth attaining.

PAGE 7

'*Dost thou think . . . too!*': This is the rebuke of Sir Toby Belch and the Clown to the self-righteous, puritanic Malvolio in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*, Act II, scene 3. Because of its use in this passage the phrase "cakes and ale" has come to stand for conviviality or eating and drinking in company.

PAGE 11

Bentham: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), English philosopher of the Utilitarian School, whose watchword was "the greatest good of the greatest number."

PAGE 12

eugenics: study of the factors that may improve or impair the physical and mental racial qualities of future generations; in other words, the science of racial heredity. It started with the work of Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911).

CIVILIZATION AND THE ARTS

W. Macneile Dixon is a scholar and critic of distinction. A humanist above everything else, he never loses sight of the real values of life. His writings include *Tragedy*, *The Human Situation*, *The Englishman*, and *An Apology for the Arts*. It is from this last-mentioned work, a collection of lectures, articles and addresses, that our essay, first published in 1942, is reproduced.

PAGE 13

Cervantes . . . Don Quixote: Miguel de Cervantes (1547-1616) was a Spanish story-teller and dramatist; he is best remembered today for his great satire on chivalry, *Don Quixote*. Its hero is a country gentleman who, crazed by reading books of knight-errantry, feels called upon to redress all wrongs; he is dreamy, unpractical but essentially good—in one word, 'quixotic.' He mistakes windmills for giants, flocks of sheep for armies, and so on, though his squire, Sancho Panza sees them for what they are.

Ictinus . . . Parthenon of Athens: Ictinus began building the Parthenon, the great Athenian temple dedicated to Athene, about 450 B. C. The friezes and embellishments of it were mainly the work of another artist, Phidias; some of these are now in the British Museum among the Elgin Marbles.

PAGE 14

Euripides: one of the three great Greek tragic dramatists of the fifth century B. C., the other two being Aeschylus and Sophocles. He is more modern and realistic than the others. Some eighteen of his numerous plays are extant.

Hobbes: Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), seventeenth century English philosopher, was a rationalist. His best-known work is *Leviathan*, expounding his political philosophy.

Locke: John Locke (1632-1704) was the author of several philosophical writings including the well-known *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, an attempt to understand the limits of man's intellect.

Beethoven: Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827), one of the greatest of European composers, introduced a romantic and emotional note into his musical compositions. His nine symphonies are most widely known.

Kant: See note on p. 127.

Rembrandt: Paul Rembrandt (1606-1669) is the principal representative of the Dutch school of painting and one of the world's great painters. He is especially noted for his handling of light and shade.

John Stuart Mill: noted English philosopher and economist of the nineteenth century (1806-1873). His most famous work is his treatise *On Liberty*. He was a champion of women's rights and his works include *The Subjection of Women*.

Michael Angelo: one of the greatest painters and sculptors of the world (1475-1564). He was also an architect and poet and, in fact, is second only to Leonardo da Vinci as a figure of the Italian Renaissance. His greatest works may be seen in Rome and Florence and are noted for their grandeur and power.

Galileo: Italian astronomer and physicist (1564-1642) who incurred the wrath of the Inquisition for daring to maintain that the earth moved round the sun. He was made publicly to recant this view but legend has it that, even while doing so, he whispered *E pur si muove!* ('And yet it moves!').

Spinoza: Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) was a Dutch philosopher of Jewish extraction. He is regarded as the greatest exponent of pantheism. He earned his living, however, as a grinder of lenses.

PAGE 15

Plato: See note on p. 127.

Aristotle: Greek philosopher (384-322 B. C.), disciple of Plato, and one of the world's greatest and most influential thinkers. His works deal with ethics, politics, metaphysics, aesthetics, poetics, etc.

Aeschylus: He is the father of the Greek drama. He lived from 525-456 B. C. and is thus the precursor of Sophocles and Euripides, the other two great Greek tragic dramatists. Seven of his plays are extant.

Aristophanes: A contemporary of Euripides and Socrates, he satirized them in his comic dramas. He is indeed the greatest of the Greek comic dramatists.

Socrates: Greek philosopher (c. 469-399 B. C.) who in Cicero's words, "brought down philosophy from the heavens to the earth," and whose life and death have been recorded so beautifully in the writings of his disciple Plato. He was condemned to death by his fellow-Athenians as a corruptor of youth.

Pericles: great Athenian statesman, during whose management of the affairs of the state (480-429 B. C.) Athens reached the height of her power and glory.

PAGE 18

man does not live by bread alone: See the *Gospel of St. Matthew*, iv, 4. Jesus has fasted for forty days and Satan tempts him, urging him to turn the stones of the wilderness into bread. Jesus replies: "It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God."

the Renaissance: This term, which means 're-birth,' is applied to the period which marks the transition from the medieval to the modern world. This rebirth of European culture was stimulated by the dissemination of Greek learning consequent upon the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. The period saw the invention of printing, the discovery of America, and the great artistic achievements of Italy, France and England from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century.

PAGE 20

Pope's famous line: This occurs in his poetical *Essay on Man*:

"Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of mankind is man."

PAGE 21

'Paradise Lost': the great epic poem of John Milton

(1608-74), in which he tells the story of the eating of the Forbidden Fruit by Adam and Eve and their consequent expulsion from the Garden of Eden.

PAGE 22

Parthenon: See note on p. 130.

a melody of Handel's: Georg Handel (1685-1759) was a prolific composer of church music. His *Saul* and *Messiah* are the best known of his works.

Turner's landscapes: Joseph Turner (1775-1851) was one of the greatest English painters; he is particularly noted for his watercolours and light effects.

Richard Steele: eighteenth-century essayist (1672-1729), who is best remembered today for his association with Joseph Addison in writing the *Spectator*, a periodical dealing with contemporary manners and morals.

PAGE 23

Garden of Eden . . . Fall: that is, before Adam and Eve had disobeyed God by eating the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil and had, consequently, been expelled from the Garden. See the *Book of Genesis*, ii and iii and the note on '*Paradise Lost*' above.

William Blake: English mystic poet (1757-1827) whose *Songs of Innocence* and *Songs of Experience* contain poems that are widely read.

representatives of Christianity itself . . . The author here devotes a couple of pages to this view of Blake's; these have been omitted.

St. Thomas: commonly known as 'Doubting Thomas' because he refused to believe that Christ had risen from the dead till he saw the imprint of the nails of the Cross on his hands and felt his side. (See the *Gospel of St. John*, xx, 24-29.) He was one of the twelve apostles or disciples of Christ, and legend has it that he came to India and established Christianity here.

PAGE 24

Nietzsche: Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) was a German philosopher who had no use for Christianity. In *Thus Spake Zarathustra* and other writings he exalted the 'will to dominate' and the 'superman' who would trample the weak underfoot.

PAGE 25

the Muses: In Greek mythology these are the nine daughters of Zeus. They came to be associated with individual arts and sciences. Thus, Clio is the Muse of History, Thalia of Comedy, Urania of Astronomy, and so on.

PAGE 26

Schopenhauer: Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a German philosopher noted for his pessimism. His philosophy is most fully expounded in *The World as Will and Idea*.

PAGE 27

Gothic minster: a medieval cathedral in the style of Westminster Abbey or the cathedrals at Chartres, Cologne and Milan. This style flourished from the 12th to the 16th centuries in northern and western Europe; it was termed Gothic to contrast it with the Classical style of architecture and was distinguished by its pointed arches and its allegorical and symbolic decorations consisting of grotesque carvings of birds, beasts and human figures.

Santayana: George Santayana (1863-1953) was a famous Spanish-born American philosopher and author noted for his cosmopolitan outlook and his devotion to classical ideals of beauty.

Hegel: See note on p. 127.

PAGE 28

Tolstoy: Count Leo Tolstoi (to adopt the more usual spelling of his name) lived from 1828 to 1910. He

was a Russian novelist, short-story writer, essayist and playwright of world fame. He was also a mystic and revolutionary social experimenter. His works include *War and Peace*, acclaimed the world's greatest novel. The quotation in the text is from his book, *What is Art?*

PAGE 29

Persephone Enna: Persophene—or Proserpine—was the daughter of Demeter—or Ceres—in classical mythology. She was gathering flowers in a field at Enna in Sicily when the God of the Underworld carried her off to his region. The earliest form of the legend is in a Homeric hymn. See also Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Bk. IV, 268–272.

Faust books: Dr. Johann Faust, or Faustus, who died about 1538, was a magician and astrologer. According to a legend that sprang up shortly after his death, he sold his soul to the devil in return for twenty-four years of additional life to be devoted to his studies and pleasures. He has been immortalized in literature by Marlowe's play, *Doctor Faustus* (c. 1592) and Goethe's *Faust* (1808-1832).

Hamlet Elsinore: The reference is to Shakespeare's Hamlet in the play of that name, which is set in Elsinore (modern Helsingør) in Denmark. He has vowed to his father's ghost that he will revenge himself on his uncle, who has killed his father and married his mother; but he thinks too much to be able to act effectively, and when he does kill his uncle, he has already been poisoned by that villain's treachery.

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

Jawaharlal Nehru is not only a statesman and citizen of the world but a thinker and writer whose books have been widely acclaimed. His *Autobiography*, *Glimpses of World History*, and the book from which our passage is

taken, namely *The Discovery of India*, are read all over the world.

PAGE 34

this sorry scheme desire: The language used is that of the well-known lines in Fitzgerald's translation of Omar Khayyam's *Rubaiyat*:

Ah Love! could thou and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!

PAGE 35

"La derniere jusque-la": 'The last stage of reason is the knowledge that there is an infinity of things that excels it. It is very weak if it cannot arrive at that.'

PAGE 38

Voltaire: French poet, dramatist, philosopher and satirist (1694-1778), whose real name was Francois Marie Arouet. He was a great enemy of superstition and organized religion and one of the most fearless thinkers of his time. His best-known work is *Candide*, a biting satire on sentimental optimism.

SCIENCE AND THE MODERN MIND

Sir Richard Livingstone is a distinguished classical scholar and educationist of our times. Sometime President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, he has written and edited several books on the contribution of Greece to civilization and on the problems of education.

PAGE 42

'All men utilitarian end': The quotation is from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

PAGE 43

the Argentine: the English name for Argentina.

the second largest South American republic. Its capital is Buenos Aires.

Antipodes: places diametrically opposite each other on the earth's surface, so that a line joining them would pass through the earth's centre.

PAGE 44

Baldwin: Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947), Conservative English statesman, who was Prime Minister during the nineteen-twenties and thirties.

the Rhine: one of the chief waterways of Europe. Rising in Switzerland and flowing through Germany and Holland, it formerly served as a natural boundary for the Roman Empire against the barbarians.

Caelum . . . currunt: 'The sky, and not their soul, they change who cross the sea'—a famous line of the Latin poet, Horace.

embarras de richesses: 'superfluity of good things.' The phrase is French, though no longer used in French.

PAGE 45

nouveaux riche: 'the new rich', 'newly-enriched persons.'

Christ . . . riches: See *St. Mathew*, xiii, 22: "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choke the word."

PAGE 46

the blue Caribbean: the part of the Atlantic that is enclosed by the West Indies, Cuba and Central and South America. It is named after the Caribbean Islands in it.

Gothic window: See the note on *Gothic minster* on p. 134.

Christ Church Meadow: an open field by the side of Christ Church College, Oxford.

William Morris, John Ruskin: Both these nineteenth-century English writers were great lovers of art.

Morris (1834-96) was not only a poet but also a Socialist and a maker of furniture, carpets and tapestries calculated to improve Victorian taste. Ruskin (1819-1900), whose disciple Morris was, led the revolt against Victorian materialism, and was an art-critic and essayist noted for his economic and social theories and for his rich prose style. The quotation in the text is from his book, *Modern Painters*, iii, 320.

PAGE 48

the origin of man Genesis: One of the world's oldest civilizations, the Babylonian or Chaldean, flourished in the country through which the Tigris and the Euphrates flow to this day. According to the *Book of Genesis*, the first book of the Bible, Adam and Eve were created in the Garden of Eden, which is traditionally located here.

Thomas Hardy: famous English novelist and poet (1863-1939). The quotations in the text are from his novel, *Far from the Madding Crowd*.

Pascal: Blaise Pascal (1623-62), from whose *Thoughts* the author quotes, was a French religious thinker and writer of great insight and charm.

'Le silence m'effraie': 'The eternal silence of the infinite spaces frightens me.'

'Toute remplir': 'All our dignity consists in thought. It is through that that it is necessary to elevate ourselves; not through space and time are we able to fulfil ourselves.'

PAGE 49

its Founder the earth: See *St. Matthew*, x, 34: "I came not to send peace, but a sword", and *St. Luke* xxii, 49: "I am come to send fire on the earth".

PAGE 51

Kulturgeschichte: a German word meaning 'history of culture.'

the study of . . . economics?: After this follows a paragraph on the need for greater knowledge than we now have of the psychological effect of different branches of study. This has been omitted.

PAGE 53

Burke: Edmund Burke (1729-97), famous English statesman and orator.

Homer: ancient Greek poet traditionally known as the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. He is said to have lived some time between 1200 and 850 B.C.

Dante: Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), the greatest Italian poet and one of the world's greatest literary figures. *The Divine Comedy*, his masterpiece, is an expression of the religious and moral outlook of the Middle Ages in Europe.

Shakespeare: William Shakespeare (1564-1616), English dramatist and the world's most widely known writer. Among his more popular plays are *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *The Merchant of Venice*, *As You Like It* and *The Tempest*.

Beethoven: See note on p. 130.

Parthenon: See note on p. 130.

the Sistine Chapel: Built in 1493 as the Pope's private chapel in the Vatican at Rome, it contains numerous paintings by famous Italian artists and the frescoes of the Creation, the Deluge and the Last Judgement by Michelangelo.

PAGE 54

'Whitehead's insistence . . . finality': Prof. A. N. Whitehead (1861-1947) was a distinguished English scientist and philosopher. The phrase quoted in the text is from his book, *Adventures of Ideas*.

PAGE 57

Oedipus complexes: 'Oedipus complex' is a term used in modern psychoanalysis to express the unconscious sexual

attachment of a son to his mother, resulting in jealousy of the father and a feeling of guilt and emotional conflict. The reference in the name is to the Greek legend about Oedipus, who unwittingly killed his father and married his mother.

psychic traumata: emotional shocks or wounds producing a more or less lasting disturbance of the mental functions.

Coleridge . . . Kubla Khan: S. T. Coleridge (1772-1834), English critic and poet, composed his fragmentary poem, *Kubla Khan*, on waking from a dream of the thirteenth-century Mongol prince's palace about which he had read in a book.

American professor . . . book: The reference is to *The Road to Xanadu* by Prof. J. L. Lowes.

PAGE 58

litterarum . . . laboramus: 'we suffer from an excess of literary compositions'.

Seneca: Roman philosopher and dramatist (died 65 A.D.).

PAGE 59

Euripides: See note on p. 130.

Wordsworth: William Wordsworth (1770-1850), the greatest English nature poet and leader of the Romantic Revival in English literature. *The Prelude*, mentioned in the text, is a long autobiographical poem.

Henry James: American-born novelist (1843-1916) who lived in England and wrote novels full of psychological analysis.

Virginia Woolf: English woman-novelist (1882-1941), whose novels are not so much stories as revelations of moods and mental experiences.

War and Peace: See note on *Tolstoy* on pp. 134, 135.

The Brothers Karamazov: the most famous work of the nineteenth-century Russian novelist, Fyodor Dostoyevsky.

The novel is rich in introspection and psychological analysis.

PAGE 60

'no more delightful': This is from F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*.

Aristotle's 'Poetics': See note on Aristotle on p. 131.

PAGE 61

Michael Angelo: See note on p. 131.

St. Paul's *Corinthians*: St. Paul, after his own conversion to Christianity, carried the new religion into various parts of the Roman Empire. His teachings are largely contained in his various *Epistles*.

PAGE 62

Shaw: George Bernard Shaw (1856-1951), great British dramatist and one of the most influential and celebrated thinkers of our age. He was an outspoken critic of conventional morality and orthodox beliefs, whether in economics, politics or religion.

Bertrand Russell: See introductory note on p. 143.

Ibsen: Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906), Norwegian dramatist whose plays on social problems exerted a tremendous influence on Bernard Shaw and on European drama generally. The poem cited is from *Lyrics and Poems from Ibsen* (translated by Garnett).

PAGE 63

I went Venice: Cited from Ruskin's *Praeterita*, ii, 366.

In the Garden the animals: This is according to the biblical story of the Creation of the World contained in the *Book of Genesis*; see especially chapter ii, verses 19 and 20. Our author is here quoting from A. N. Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*.

Bridges: Robert Bridges (1844-1930), English poet

and essayist. His greatest work is the long poem, *The Testament of Beauty*; the poem referred to in the text is one of his numerous lyrics.

Tennyson: Alfred Tennyson (1809-92), the most representative English poet of the Victorian age and one of the greatest literary artists England has produced. Some of his lyrics, like the lines *To a Daisy* referred to in the text, are among the best in the language.

PAGE 64

the tree of knowledge . . . life: This refers to the biblical story of the Fall of Man as told in *Genesis*, iii. In the Garden of Eden were all varieties of trees, including the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil and the Tree of Life. Adam and Eve ate the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge in spite of its being the only fruit they were forbidden to eat.

PAGE 65

Nietzsche: See note on p. 134.

Bergson's philosophy: See note on *Bergson* on p. 128.

Kierkegaard: Danish philosopher (1813-1855), whose philosophy is based on faith, knowledge, thought and reality and has greatly influenced some schools of twentieth-century thought.

existentialism: a modern philosophy, developed mainly in France after the Second World War. It seems to rest on the belief that 'we and things in general exist, and that is all there is to this absurd business of living'. Its great literary propagandist is Jean Paul Sartre, French novelist and playwright.

D. H. Lawrence: English novelist, short-story writer and poet (1885-1930). He revolted violently against social conventions, especially in matters of sex, and advocated a return to primitive attitudes and ways of life.

surrealism: a revolutionary movement in art and literature which originated in Paris in 1924 and aims at

achieving effects of 'super-realism' through reliance on the unconscious in combining words and images.

THE ETHICS OF POWER

Bertrand Russell (born 1872) is a world-renowned mathematician and philosopher, who has written numerous thought-provoking books on social, political and cultural problems. His is one of the acutest minds of today. Among his many writings are *Marriage and Morals*, *The Conquest of Happiness*, *Education and the Modern World*, *A History of Western Philosophy*. Our passage forms one of the chapters in his book *power: A New Social Analysis* (1938).

PAGE 67

Love of power: There is a paragraph preceding this in the original; it points back to the earlier chapters in the book and adds that it is not to be concluded from these that it would be best to renounce all power.

PAGE 68

Christ's third temptation . . . wilderness: See note on p. 132 and *St. Mathew*, iv, 8-10: "Again the devil taketh him up into an exceeding high mountain, and sheweth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them: And saith unto him, 'All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me.' Then saith Jesus unto him, 'Get thee hence, Satan: for it is written Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve'.

PAGE 74

Flat Earth Society: This is doubtless the author's playful way of referring to those who may hold to the belief of the sixth-century traveller, Cosmas, that the earth was not round, but flat.

Guy Fawkes . . . train: He was to have touched off

the gunpowder which, as planned by the Roman Catholics in the Gunpowder Plot, was to blow up the Houses of Parliament on the 5th November 1605. (*train 'a line of combustible material.'*)

PAGE 75

Hegel: See note on p. 127.

PAGE 76

at last the same king: As the son of Mary, Queen of Scots, James was proclaimed King of Scotland in 1567 and thus became James VI of Scotland. In 1603 he inherited the English Crown as well and became King James I of England; and the two countries continue to have a common sovereign to this day.

Dr. Johnson: Samuel Johnson (1709-84), famous critic, essayist, scholar and lexicographer, was one of the most interesting personalities of his age. His biographer, James Boswell, has recorded several of his witty comments on Scotsmen and Scotland, which were inspired by a prejudice against that country and its culture.

PAGE 77

Pythagoras: celebrated Greek mathematician and philosopher of the 6th century B.C., whose name is associated with the doctrines of the transmigration of souls and the music of the spheres. He founded a brotherhood whose members practised temperance and purity and were vegetarians.

Galileo: See note on p. 131.

THE GANDHIAN WAY

Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of India, has won world renown as a thinker and philosopher and as an interpreter of the thought of the East to the West. He was for some years Spalding Professor of Oriental

Philosophy at Oxford and is the author of several books, among them are *The Hindu View of Life*, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, and *Religion and Society*. The selection here printed is a section of his introduction to the symposium, *Mahatma Gandhi: Essays and Reflections on His Life and Work*, presented to Gandhiji on his seventieth birthday, in 1939. The section is there entitled 'Satyāgraha.'

PAGE 79

Māhabhārata: the great epic poem on the struggle between the Pandavas and the Kauravas in ancient India. It is the *Iliad* of India, as the *Ramayana* is its *Odyssey*, and between them these two Indian epics present a vivid picture of the religion and culture of ancient India. The *Bhagavadgita* is part of the *Māhabhārata*.

PAGE 80

'*The gates . . . prevail*.' See *St. Matthew*, xvi, 18. "And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

The meek . . . earth: another biblical phrase; see *St. Matthew*, v, 5: "Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth"—one of the Nine Beatitudes with which Jesus began his famous Sermon on the Mount.

lose save themselves: An echo of Christ's words: "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." (*St. Matthew*, x, 30.)

PAGE 81

Prāno virāt: Sanskrit for 'life is infinite.'

Darwinian struggle for existence: See note on p. 128.

leave fighting to apes and dogs: Cf. Browning's *A Grammarian's Funeral*:

Others mistrust and say—'But time escapes!

Live now or never!"
 He said, 'What's time? Leave Now for dogs and apes!
 Man has Forever.'

PAGE 82

Organized . . . Africa: It was in South Africa that Gandhiji first used the method of satyāgraha for fighting social and political injustice. See his autobiography, '*The Story of My Experiments with Truth*,' especially chapter 26, entitled 'The Birth of Satyāgraha.'

During the war: The reference is to the war of 1914-18.

General Smuts: Jan Christian Smuts, the great South African soldier and statesman, against whose anti-Indian legislation Gandhiji led his campaign of satyāgraha in South Africa. There is a fine tribute by him to Gandhiji on pages 276-81 of the volume from which our passage is taken.

PAGE 83

the war to end war: The war of 1914-18, so called because this was one of the slogans of the Allies banded against Germany.

engage Satan to reprove Satan: An echo of Christ's words "How can Satan cast out Satan?" (*Gospel of St. Mark*, iii, 23.)

contrary to . . . Jesus: Jesus was against meeting evil with evil. Thus: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." (*St. Matthew*, v, 38, 39.)

PAGE 84

Nazi Germany: Germany as it was under Adolf Hitler, the leader of the National-Socialist Party from 1919 till the end of the Second World War in 1945. 'Nazi' is

short for German 'nationalen Sozialisten' and is pronounced 'naatsi'.

the Fascist party: The nationalistic, anti-communist and anti-parliamentary Italian party led by Mussolini from 1919 till the collapse of Italy during the Second World War. It derives its name from the 'fascio' or bundle of rods with an axe which, as a token of the power of the State, was borne in front of the consuls in ancient Rome.

Mussolini: Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) was dictator of Italy from 1919 till his death at the hands of his own people in 1945. He founded the Fascist party and was its 'Duce' (Italian for 'leader'), as Hitler was the 'Fuehrer' (German for 'leader') of the Nazis.

PAGE 85

the right to throw the first stone: The phrase 'to throw the first stone' means 'to be the first to find fault or accuse' and goes back to Christ's words to the accusers of the woman taken in adultery: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." (*St John*, viii, 7.).

The Archbishop of Canterbury: The highest ecclesiastic in the Church of England.

PAGE 86

like the Apostles man: The term 'apostles', meaning 'messengers' was the name used by Christ for his twelve disciples; and the reference here is to the occasion when some of them, including the first apostle Peter, were accused by the high priest of the Jews of having disobeyed the injunction laid on them not to preach the doctrine of their master Christ. Their reply was: "We ought to obey God rather than men" (*Acts of the Apostles*, v, 29.).

PAGE 88

New York Times: One of the most influential and widely read daily newspapers in the United States.

the March crisis: the very dangerous international situation created in March 1939 by Hitler's seizure of the whole of Czechoslovakia. This was in violation of the Munich agreement signed by Germany, Britain and France guaranteeing the frontiers of that country after Hitler had been allowed to swallow up some of it. The result was the end of the period of appeasement of Hitler by France and Britain.

PAGE 89

'avidya': ignorance, spiritual darkness.

PAGE 90

the golden age: the fabled age in human history when mankind was supremely happy and all was perfectly all right with the world.

CAUSES OF WAR

Aldous Huxley (born 1894) is one of the most versatile and effective writers of our times. His novels, short-stories, satires, essays, historical biographies, critical and philosophical writings, are all remarkable for their penetration and skill. He has latterly turned to eastern thought and is highly critical of western materialism. Among his writings are *Brave New World*, *Point Counterpoint*, *Grey Eminence*, *The Perennial Philosophy*, and *Ends and Means*. Our passage is part of the chapter on War in the last-named book.

PAGE 93

the most thrilling news: In the original there are two pages more under the first head; these have been omitted.

ex hypothesi: A modern Latin phrase meaning 'supposedly,' 'from the hypothesis.'

PAGE 94

'get a kick': An Americanism meaning 'get a stimu-

lus,' the word 'kick' being used in the sense of 'a sharp stimulant effect.'

PAGE 96

man Sabbath: Here the phrase implies that machinery must serve the purpose of man and not man of machinery. One of the Ten Commandments lays it down that the seventh day of the week must be observed as the Sabbath or day of rest (see *Exodus*, xx, 9-11). Hence on a certain occasion, when Christ's disciples plucked the ears of corn on a sabbath day, they were accused of having broken the commandment; but Christ replied: "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath" (see *St. Mark*, ii, 23-28).

PAGE 97

ad infinitum: Latin for 'for ever; ceaselessly; without limit.'

casus belli: 'act justifying war'; also Latin.

PAGE 98

Mohammedan invasions: at various times and in various countries from the end of the seventh century to the end of the seventeenth.

the Crusades: Holy expeditions sent out from Europe by Christian nations to recover Palestine from the Moslem Saracens. This was in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries.

the Wars of religion centuries: such as the Thirty Years' War between the Catholic and Protestant princes in Germany.

French Revolutionary Wars: the wars caused by, and contemporary with, the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century. The French armies were confronted with those of Austria, Prussia, Britain, Holland and Spain and won glorious victories over them, led as

they were, for the greater part, by that soldier of genius, Napoleon.

American Civil War: The war between the Northern and the Southern States of the Union in 1861, fought over the right claimed by the latter to secede from the Union and to keep their slaves. Under the political leadership of Abraham Lincoln, then President, the Union was saved and slavery abolished.

Spanish Civil War: from 1936 to 1939. General Franco rose against the newly-elected Popular Front government in republican Spain. Germany and Italy supported the insurgents, while Russia and France aided the government. Numerous volunteers from many countries formed an International Brigade to support the republicans, but the war ended with the victory of Franco, who is the dictator of the country to this day.

PAGE 99

The Assyrian monarchs: The Assyrian Empire in Asia Minor succeeded the Babylonian about 1400 B. C. and continued till 607 B. C., when the Medes took its capital, Nineveh. About 1100 B. C. it was the greatest power in the world. Its kings, especially Tiglath-Pileser I and IV, were great conquerors.

Alexander the Great: In the fourth century B. C. Alexander, King of Macedon, extended his empire from Greece to India and from Egypt to the Caspian Sea. All this was done within the short period of some thirteen years—from 336, when he succeeded his father as King of Macedon, to his death in 323 B. C.

Louis XIV: One of the greatest of the kings of France, he reigned autocratically and extravagantly for 72 years: 1643-1715. He is known in history as "le Grand Monarque" ('the great Monarch') and "le Roi Soleil" ('the Sun King'). During his long reign France reached the height of her glory, both culturally and militarily.

the dynasts . . . Europe: The reference is to such

wars, started by European rulers for increasing their possessions, as the Seven Years' War. This was fought from 1756 to 1763 by an alliance of Austria, France and Russia against Prussia (under Frederick the great) and England.

Napoleon: Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), French military officer who rose to be Emperor of France and overran the greater part of Europe. He was decisively defeated, however, in the battle of Waterloo in 1815 and spent his last years in exile on the island of St. Helena.

Tudor monarchs: The English sovereigns Henry VII, Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, who reigned from 1485 to 1603, belong to the Tudor dynasty, named after its founder Owen Tudor.

PAGE 101

If Germany . . . Russia: This was written in 1937 when the Western world expected Hitler to turn to the east in his desire to find *lebensraum* or living-space for Germany.

Lorraine: Situated between France and Germany, this region, rich in coal, iron, and salt deposits and in arable land and vineyards, has been debatable territory from the earliest times. Its chief town is Metz.

Japan's . . . Manchuria: The Japanese, who had long claimed special privileges in this north-eastern territory of China, with its capital in Munkden, occupied it in 1931 and soon turned it into a nominally independent state with a puppet emperor.

Rio Tinto: town in south-western Spain, near Seville; it has the oldest and richest copper mines in the world.

Bilbao: the most important port in Northern Spain and the centre of a rich iron and copper mining district.

PAGE 103

Left-wing parties: political parties with progressive

views, as distinguished from those of the 'right' with conservative views, and those of the 'centre' with moderate views. The terms originate from the positions the parties occupied to the left, right and centre of the President in the French National Assembly of 1789.

PAGE 105

Sir Basil Zaharoff: millionaire financier and politician who made his money in the armaments trade. He was of Russian and Greek parentage but became a naturalized British subject and rendered valuable services to the Allies during the First World War.

PAGE 107

oil magnates: those, like the Rockefellers, who control big oil companies and wield tremendous influence over their governments through their wealth.

NATIONLISM AND ITS FRUITS

John Dewey (born 1859) is a well-known American philosopher, pioneer in education, and champion of democracy, whose writings have had enormous influence. Among his numerous works are *Democracy and Education*, *Philosophy and Civilization*, *A Common Faith*, and *Characters and Events*. Our passage is from the last-named, published in 1929.

PAGE 112

The rabies to death: This refers to the fear of Communist Russia, or the Red Scare as it was called, that prevailed in the 1920's. It led to the arrest, trial and conviction of two Italian-born American radicals, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, for a robbery with murder committed by a gang of bandits in Massachusetts in 1920. There was a storm of protest against the convictions as unjust and based on flimsy evidence, but the two men were nevertheless executed in 1927.

PAGE 113

Alaska: a cold and mountainous region in the extreme northwest of North America with the Arctic Ocean to the north and Canada to the east. It was Russian territory till 1867, when it was bought from Russia by the United States. Its boundary with Canada continued to be in dispute till 1903.

PAGE 114

the new Coolidge . . . law: so-called here because it was passed during the term of Calvin Coolidge, who was President of the United States from 1923 to 1929.

the Great Powers: the leading nations. When this essay was written, that is, between the two World Wars, Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan were the five Great Powers; after the Second World War the five are the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China.

the doctrine . . . kings: the claim made, especially in the seventeenth century by the Stuarts reigning over Britain, that kings reigned by direct ordinance of God and were therefore not subject to the will of those whom they ruled over. The English poet, Pope, ridicules this notion in his line, "The right divine of kings to govern wrong."

PAGE 116

the World War: the First World War, 1914-18, for which the guilt was fixed by the Peace Treaty of 1919, on Germany and her allies.

THE NEXT STAGE OF HISTORY

H. G. Wells (1866-1946) was a prolific novelist, journalist, social philosopher and historian whose writings are widely read and have been a great force in our times. He was a visionary and predicted the use of tanks, aero-

planes and the atom bomb in modern warfare. His sociological writings include *Mankind in the Making*, *A Modern Utopia*, *The Way to World Peace*, *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*, *The Shape of Things to Come*, *The New World Order*, and *The Outline of History*. Our text reproduces the concluding sections of *The Outline of History*.

PAGE 118

Athens of Pericles: See note on *Pericles* on p. 132.
the Medici: The Medici were a brilliant and wealthy family that ruled over Florence in the 15th century. The greatest of them was Lorenzo, known as the Magnificent, because of the way he spent his wealth in beautifying the city and encouraging the arts.

Elizabethan England: The reign of Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603) was a glorious period in English cultural and political history. It was, among other things, the age of Shakespeare, Spenser, Raleigh, Drake and a host of other outstanding men of letters and action.

Asoka: Emperor of India from 264 to 228 B. C. and one of the world's great rulers. He adopted and spread Buddhism and ruled with justice and mercy. His inscriptions are to be found all over India.

the Tang and Ming periods in art: The Tang dynasty of ancient China flourished from 618 to 907 A. D., and the Ming dynasty from 1368 to 1644. These two periods of Chinese history are remarkable for their output in painting, porcelain, fabrics, etc.

We have seen how: This refers to Book VII, chap. 34, section 7 of *The Outline of History*.

Newtons: Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) is famous for his discovery of the Law of Gravitation. Seeing an apple fall to the ground he was led to the formulation of this law.

Daltons: John Dalton (1766-1844) was one of the greatest of chemists and is famous for his Atomic Theory of Matter.

Darwins: See note on *Evolution* on p. 128.

Bacons: The reference is doubtless to Francis Bacon (1561-1626), famous philosopher and statesman, who was for a time Lord Chancellor of England. He is the Father of the English Essay and is also remarkable for his interest in scientific experiments and problems.

Huxleys: See note on p. 128.

PAGE 119

the late war: The reference is to the battles in France and Belgium during the World War of 1914-18.

PAGE 121

its . . . playground . . . : a couple of paragraphs pointing back to earlier chapters in the work have been omitted here.

PAGE 124

the Great Powers: See note on p. 153.

PAGE 125

Christendom: the Christian countries and peoples.

the mechanical revolution: More commonly known as the Industrial Revolution, this change in industry came with the substitution of steam for hand labour and by the building of factories in which things were now manufactured instead of in the homes of craftsmen. It began in England in the latter half of the 18th century and has led to a concentration of population in urban areas and a standardization of life and outlook.

the Great War: The World War of 1914-18.

progresses and will progress . . . : A few lines drawing the reader's attention to past history have been omitted.